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TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF SPITE 
Nadav Shoked 
ABSTRACT—Spite’s role in property law is garnering much academic 
attention. Yet spite remains strikingly misunderstood. Commentators 
partaking in the reinvigorated debate over property rights’ nature often 
point at the law’s prohibition on spiteful uses of property by owners as 
indicating that property law is sensitive to individuals’ goals and attitudes 
when distributing powers. This assertion draws on a long line of judicial, 
legislative, and scholarly pronouncements to the effect that the prohibition 
on spite is an intent-based, subjective test banning acts whose motivation is 
malicious. This Article illustrates that this perception is deeply flawed—
descriptively and normatively. Exploring the forgotten history of spite law, 
this Article finds that in practice the spite prohibition never policed mental 
states. Rather, the spite prohibition was utilized, in different legal subfields 
and at different times, to stealthily introduce objective public policy limits 
to curb owners’ freedom of action when property law formally accorded 
the owners absolute powers. Spite law thereby performed a constant, and 
exceptionally important, role in the development of American law: it 
blunted the effect of rules sparing owners the need to consider the impacts 
of their property uses, and it paved the way for the explicit, and exhaustive, 
regulation of property uses that eventually dislodged such rules. The 
Article then proceeds to argue that this choice American law made, to 
divorce spite’s legal function from the term’s common meaning, is 
normatively warranted. Fierce scholarly denunciations of acts spitefully 
motivated ignore the illusory nature of the distinction between spiteful and 
nonspiteful motivations. This Article demonstrates that, given current 
property law’s structure and aims, spiteful acts are also, inevitably and 
always, nonspiteful. Property ownership is inherently spiteful; thus, while 
certain uses of property can—and must—be deemed unacceptable, property 
owners’ motivations for picking those uses cannot. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, Alan Markovitz erected a twelve-foot-high, spotlit, bronze 
statue on his Michigan lakefront property. It faced his neighbor’s windows. 
That neighbor, Lea Tuohy, was Markovitz’s former wife, and the statue 
was shaped as a hand with its middle finger raised.1 Markovitz’s act was 
undeniably blunt, but it was not distinctive in intent—many other owners 
before and after have sought to annoy their neighbors.2 Markovitz’s 
undertaking was noteworthy, nonetheless: other owners aiming to torment 
their neighbors normally settle for constructing a fence obstructing those 
neighbors’ views.3 Markovitz diverged from this more traditional route 
 
1 David Hopkins, American Directs Large ‘Middle Finger’ Statue at Home of Ex-Wife, TELEGRAPH 
(Nov. 18, 2013, 3:04 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10457437/
American-directs-large-middle-finger-statue-at-home-of-ex-wife.html [http://perma.cc/92WW-6NLH]; 
Update: Orchard Lake Man Erects Giant Sculpture to Flip Off His Neighbor, DEADLINE DETROIT 
(Nov. 16, 2013, 8:31 AM), http://www.deadlinedetroit.com/articles/7248/bloomfield_hills_
man_builds_giant_statue_to_flip_off_his_ex-wife#.VO97w_nF9x0 [http://perma.cc/VX5K-52TV]. 
2 The most extreme cases involve “spite houses” built solely to annoy neighbors or a local 
government—by blocking roads or views—even though they offer little, if anything, by way of 
habitability. See, e.g., John Kelly, Answer Man: In Search of Houses That Spite Built, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 26, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/25/
AR2006032500903.html [http://perma.cc/HD97-3HTZ].  
3 See infra Section II.B. 
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since he found it too subtle.4 Unintentionally, however, his choice was also 
legally sensible. Had he opted for a fence facing Tuohy’s windows, the 
common law could have held him liable.5 As a legal matter, such a fence 
could have been deemed motivated by spite and thus a nuisance. Against 
the statue facing her windows, on the other hand, Tuohy had no viable legal 
recourse.6 As a legal matter, a statue—even one shaped as a middle 
finger—cannot be perceived as motivated by actionable spite. 
These contrasting results would strike most observers as somewhat 
odd. A middle finger statue more easily smacks of spite than a fence, even 
when that fence intentionally blocks a neighbor’s lake views. Apparently, 
spite in the law does not correspond to the behavior and attitude 
conventionally associated with the terms “spiteful” or “spite.” But if legal 
spite does not stand for spite, what does it stand for? This Article will, for 
the first time, answer this question. 
The question respecting spite’s legal function is exceedingly important 
because property law’s recognition of spite stands out. The prohibition on 
spite, even if laboriously constrained, eliminates an owner’s freedom to 
engage in activities on her land that are otherwise—as far as the law is 
concerned—wholly uncontroversial. An owner is normally free, for 
example, to construct a fence on her land even when that fence interferes 
with a neighboring property’s exposure to light and air,7 or its aesthetically 
pleasing environs.8 This most basic freedom to build the fence is lost, 
however, if the constructing owner acted on spite. Of course, there are 
other limits on the owner’s freedom: an owner may be barred, for instance, 
from developing her land in a manner that floods neighboring lands;9 or she 
may be prohibited from choosing entrants based on race.10 But the curb on 
the owner’s freedom instituted here through spite law is still remarkable. 
When an American court first recognized spite as a limit to an owner’s 
freedom to build, in the case of Burke v. Smith, the dissenting judge was 
 
4 Markovitz explained that he erected the statue as a message to the man with whom Tuohy was 
cohabitating: “‘This is about him. This is about him not being a man.’ ‘He broke the Man Code.’ ‘Real 
men don’t do that to another guy.’” Hopkins, supra note 1. 
5 See Burke v. Smith, 37 N.W. 838, 841–42 (Mich. 1888). 
6 See Wernke v. Halas, 600 N.E.2d 117, 122 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that “tasteless 
decoration,” specifically, a toilet seat with paint representing excrement mounted on a pole, “is merely 
an aesthetic annoyance” incapable of giving rise to a legal claim). 
7 1 AM. JUR. 2D Adjoining Landowners §§ 102–103, at 1005–07 (2005). For a comprehensive 
discussion, see infra Section II.B. 
8 E.g., Oliver v. AT&T Wireless Servs., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 491, 500 (Ct. App. 1999) (“[T]he 
unpleasant appearance of neighboring property, in and of itself, does not rise to the level of a 
nuisance.”).  
9 E.g., Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 120 A.2d 4, 10 (N.J. 1956). 
10 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012). 
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aghast: “[But] the motives of a party in doing a legal act cannot form the 
basis upon which to found a remedy against such party.”11 This laconic 
assertion of an elemental property truism should have sufficed, in the 
dissenter’s mind, to deflect any legal claim based on spite. 
For property law is always agnostic to actors’ intent.12 None of the 
other legal checks on an owner’s freedom concerns her motives.13 Yet the 
rein spite law places on an owner’s freedom to engage in otherwise 
legitimate activities appears to be distinctly based on her subjective goals. 
The majority opinion enjoining the fence the defendant constructed in the 
pioneering Burke case, stated as much: 
What right has the defendant, in the light of the just and beneficent principles 
of equity, to [act on his land] . . . simply to gratify his own wicked malice 
against his neighbor? None whatever. . . . [N]o man can pollute the 
atmosphere, or shut out the light of heaven, for no better reason than that . . . 
he . . . wishes to gratify his spite and malice towards his neighbor.14 
Thus formulated, spite law illustrates that “the law does sometimes 
care about owners’ reasons for deciding, and this fact . . . provides a crucial 
insight into the nature of ownership . . . .”15 The insight is crucial because it 
inducts a new, and arguably transformational, element into property 
theory.16 The major undertaking of the burgeoning scholarship in this field 
is the isolation of the nature of property as a distinct legal and social 
institution. This task implies the identification of ownership’s outer ambit. 
The continued presence of spite doctrine in American law, ostensibly 
delineating owners’ sphere of action in correspondence to the 
wholesomeness of their feelings, enriches any such discussion. It points at a 
 
11 37 N.W. 838, 845 (Mich. 1888) (Champlin, J., dissenting). 
12 See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 563 N.W.2d 154, 159–60 (Wis. 1997) (ignoring in a 
trespass case an owner’s reasoning for not allowing an entrant). Arguably, an exception might be the 
necessity defense to trespass. A trespasser will avoid liability if she can show that she acted to prevent 
imminent harm. To avail herself of this defense, however, the trespasser must satisfy other requirements 
as well; for example, she must have chosen the lesser of two evils, she must have reasonably anticipated 
a direct causal relationship between the trespass and the harm to be averted, and she must have had no 
legal alternative to trespassing. E.g., United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1991). In 
light of these diverse—and cumbersome—objective conditions that must be met, see David Dana & 
Nadav Shoked, Public, by Necessity, 13 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 341, 366–69 (2014), it is probably 
inaccurate to characterize the necessity defense as truly intent-based. 
13 Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 641–43 (1988) 
(listing the curbs the law places on owners’ freedom). 
14 37 N.W. at 842 (majority opinion). 
15 Larissa Katz, Spite and Extortion: A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse of Property Right, 
122 YALE L.J. 1444, 1448 (2013). 
16 See infra notes 68–76 and accompanying text. 
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very clear and meaningful limit to ownership that is of a different cast from 
those limits normally conceded.17 
This reigning understanding of spite’s key normative role hinges on 
one core assumption: that spite law tackles an owner’s animus towards her 
neighbor. This assumption has never been tested against the actual law and 
history—as opposed to rhetoric—of American spite. Spite law has been 
taken at its word. Yet as this Introduction already illustrated in its opening 
example, that assumption is dubious. If an owner is not allowed to 
construct a fence facing a neighboring property because of his spiteful 
motivation, but is allowed to construct a middle-finger statue pointed at 
that same neighboring property, animated by the same spiteful motivation, 
spite law attends to something different from plain spite.  
And the nonspiteful middle-finger statue is far from the sole 
inconsistency. Anomalies abound. In 1902, for example, the industrialist 
and financier Henry Clay Frick insisted that his company’s new Pittsburgh 
headquarters tower over, and constantly shadow, the neighboring 
skyscraper housing the company of his former partner, now his nemesis, 
Andrew Carnegie.18 Still, the project encountered no legal hurdles.19 In 
1959, for another example, Ben Novack, owner of Miami Beach’s most 
glamorous hotel, the Fontainebleau, was constructing an annex along the 
hotel’s property line, thereby blocking sunrays from reaching the adjoining 
hotel’s pool.20 That adjoining hotel, the Eden Roc, was owned by Novack’s 
former partner, now his nemesis, Harry Mufson; Novack resolved that the 
addition’s wall facing the Eden Roc would be blank, made of concrete, and 
windowless—other than one small cluster of windows installed in his own 
private suite so that he could look down at the Eden Roc’s shaded pool and 
gloat.21 The structure became locally known as “the spite wall”22 but still, in 
a famed property law decision,23 the Florida court dismissed Eden Roc’s 
challenge to it.24 
 
17 See infra Part I. 
18 French Strother, Frick, the Silent: Successor to Mr. Carnegie, Possible Successor to Mr. 
Harriman, in 14 THE WORLD’S WORK: A HISTORY OF OUR TIME 8849, 8856 (Walter H. Page ed., 
1907). 
19 See id. 
20 SETH BRAMSON, IMAGES OF AMERICA: MIAMI BEACH 108 (2005); Joseph Brown, Eden Roc 
Hotel Miami Beach: A New Tower that Ends the Feud, S. BEACH MAG. (Jan. 9, 2008), 
http://www.southbeachmagazine.com/eden-roc-hotel-miami-beach/ [http://perma.cc/VL4A-6WR6]. 
21 Brown, supra note 20. 
22 Id. 
23 Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1959). The case features prominently in casebooks, for example, THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. 
SMITH, PROPERTY 1013–16 (2d ed. 2012); JOSEPH SINGER ET AL., PROPERTY LAW 367 (6th ed. 2014). 
24 Fontainebleau, 114 So. 2d 357. 
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These examples tentatively indicate the argument that this Article will 
methodically establish: the prevailing assumption respecting spite’s legal 
nature is flawed. As its American history will make clear, spite, as a limit 
to ownership, is not, and never was, truly concerned with owners’ 
subjective motivations. Spite law is concerned with something else, 
something very different from actual spite. Counterintuitively, spite law, I 
will argue, traffics in objective—not subjective—values. Rather than 
calling on courts to scrutinize owners’ intentions as previous authors 
assume, spite law has empowered courts to balance the social values of 
different property uses, thereby subverting property rules that formally 
granted owners absolute freedom to use their property. 
Although when grasped in these terms, spite doctrine ceases to 
represent the exceptional case where property outcomes revolve around 
mental states, it remains an exceptionally telling element of property law. 
Indeed, it emerges from this Article as an even more revelatory common 
law component than previously believed. Through the two-hundred-year-
long-and-counting story of spite, a constant of property law crystalizes: 
aspirations for absolute protections for owners’ autonomy, free from the 
burden of balancing tests characteristic of other legal fields,25 uniformly 
failed. Repeatedly, property rules crafted to bestow on owners an 
unhindered freedom of action were soon unsettled by judicial action—by 
judges falling back on a spite test that was seemingly subjective but 
actually enabled courts to engage in objective balancing of interests before 
approving an owner’s act. Once this crack opened by spite law widened, 
and the relevant absolute owner freedom rule was formally toppled and 
replaced by objective balancing tests, the prohibition on spite—which had 
originally introduced these tests surreptitiously—lost its utility, and as a 
legal doctrine petered out. It no longer expanded to tackle new factual 
patterns as they emerged, and thus its reach was irrationally delimited to 
specific scenarios already covered. Left behind were islands of supposedly 
prohibited spiteful uses—such as the actionable spite fence—which persist 
as peculiarities, aberrations given modern property law’s overall design. 
This development is hardly lamentable. Quite the opposite: it is 
inevitable and normatively desirable. The descriptive argument made by 
this Article—that the law never consistently targeted malevolent owners—
will be accompanied by a corresponding normative argument: that the law 
should not target malevolent owners. Jurists and commentators who 
 
25 E.g., Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 
975–80 (2004) (arguing property law differs from tort law since, while the latter focuses on 
empowering courts to evaluate “proper use,” property delegates all decisionmaking powers to the 
owner). 
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unanimously champion spite doctrine as a tool to incorporate sensitivity to 
undesirable mental states into property law fail to provide persuasive 
reasons for their position. Though the prevalent and forceful statements that 
an owner should not be permitted to satisfy her “malice and wickedness”26 
or “use her position just in order to harm someone else”27 may appear 
intuitive and unassailable, they are out of sync with property’s normative 
goals. Property law is a major tool for facilitating the expression of relative 
status.28 Through property, owners convey to others the message that those 
others do not measure up. Property law could not have banned Frick from 
shading Carnegie’s Pittsburgh headquarters, since it would not bar Frick 
from constructing his New York mansion, even after the robber baron 
allegedly stated that he was doing it to “make Carnegie’s place [located 
twenty blocks to the north] look like a miner’s shack.”29 There can be 
nothing intrinsically wrong with an owner aiming to upset her neighbor 
when she is completely free to venture to distress her neighbor by flaunting 
her status, resources, or taste—by flaunting her property—in front of that 
neighbor. Spitefulness, or at least the possibility thereof, is inherent to 
ownership, and thus an owner cannot be disciplined for acting on spiteful 
motivations. 
Moreover, any such futile attempt to isolate and chastise spiteful 
motivations comes at a steep normative cost. It must divert attention away 
from meaningful cost–benefit analysis and towards irrelevant, and vain, 
explorations into human motivations. The questions with which property 
law ought to be occupied are not: “Is Mr. Markovitz bitter?”; “Is Mr. Smith 
venous?”; “Is Mr. Frick petty?”; or “Is Mr. Novack vindictive?” The 
question should always be: “Is a statue in Mr. Markovitz’s yard, a fence on 
Mr. Smith’s property, a tower for Mr. Frick’s headquarters, or a wall for 
Mr. Novack’s hotel, socially beneficial?” 
This Article thus pursues two goals: to undermine the current 
literature’s assumption that, in American law, spite has operated as a 
prohibition on malicious motivations, and to challenge the literature’s 
normative stance against such motivations. The Article establishes these 
twin contentions as follows. Part I reviews spite doctrine as commonly 
perceived and explains why writers believe the doctrine is key to 
 
26 Burke v. Smith, 37 N.W. 838, 840 (Mich. 1888). 
27 Katz, supra note 15, at 1451. 
28 See generally Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2009) 
(exploring property’s status-signaling function and that function’s interaction with doctrines of property 
law). 
29 Christopher Gray, Carnegie vs. Frick: Dueling Egos on Fifth Avenue, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2000, 
§ 11, at 7. 
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understanding property rights’ nature. In this context the move many make 
to equate the doctrine with the broader European “abuse of right” principle 
is surveyed. This dominant descriptive position—that spite represents a 
rule disallowing certain motives—is discredited in Part II, which 
comprehensively explores, as never done before, spite’s history in 
American law. It finds that spite has never functioned as a general doctrine 
comparable to an abuse of right principle. Rather, its domain was always 
limited to specific subfields. Identifying the disparate property subfields 
where spite has manifested itself throughout American history—water law, 
land use, support rights, and restraints on alienation—and chronicling its 
development in each, Part II finds that in none did the doctrine focus on the 
owner’s animus as commonly assumed. Instead it always performed a 
different, yet still important, function in the maturation of the legal regime 
governing the relevant subfield. Part III then makes the normative case 
supporting property law’s refusal to focus on mental states. To refute the 
dominant position advocating the interdiction of spiteful acts, Part III 
highlights the illusory distinction between a motivation solely to harm 
another—a spiteful motivation—and a motivation to derive a benefit—a 
nonspiteful motivation. The problem is identified through cases involving 
neighbors who are business competitors—mostly found in signage law—
and then generalized, engendering the conclusion that property law must 
rely on objective tests of means and effects, rather than subjective tests of 
motive. 
I. THE CURRENT UNDERSTANDING OF SPITE’S PLACE IN 
PROPERTY LAW 
In a world where space is finite, owners are always surrounded by 
other owners. Consequently, there are hardly any activities an owner may 
engage in on his land that will not affect other owners. If he constructs a 
building, other owners’ adjacent lands may lose their exposure to sun or 
their soil’s support. If he operates a business, those lands may be saddled 
by noise or concomitant traffic. If he drills for oil, those lands may be 
deprived of oil or exposed to toxic fumes. Therefore, one of property law’s 
most important tasks is to regulate the relationship between neighboring 
owners. 
Spite doctrine performs this role: it deigns illegitimate certain owner 
activities that detrimentally affect a neighboring owner. Hence it is of 
undeniable practical significance. It is of even greater normative interest on 
account of its relationship to other elements of property law. The 
juxtaposition of spite with those other legal components highlights spite’s 
alleged uniqueness, but also points at its potential centrality for the 
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operation of property law. Therefore, after introducing spite doctrine as 
commonly read, this Part will explore the work of the many recent writers 
who claim that spite law—due to that current reading—represents a much 
broader principle inherent to the common law’s idea of ownership. In this 
way, this Part sets the stage for the next parts of the Article, which cast 
doubt over this understanding of spite and of its theoretical import. 
A. Spite Law as Commonly Read 
Spite’s role in property law appears straightforward. Though in both 
popular imagination and much philosophical thinking property ownership 
is associated with freedom,30 in practice property law cannot afford owners 
anything resembling absolute freedom, due to the inevitable conflicts 
between owners that will ensue.31 Hence property rules are often mainly 
concerned not with the freedom of the owner, but rather with setting that 
freedom’s contours. They define property rights and place limits on their 
exercise to forestall or settle conflicts between owners. Property rules may 
prevent the owner from operating a business or drilling for oil; or they may 
regulate his capacity to do so by instituting allowable hours of operation, 
permissible volume of oil to be pumped, etc. These and similar tasks in 
other cases are performed by diverse property doctrines, including nuisance 
law, rules respecting the acquisition of property rights, environmental 
regulations, and zoning ordinances. Spite is one of these many doctrines 
that help draw the sphere of an owner’s freedom: It prohibits the owner 
from exercising his freedom in certain ways to protect others. 
The substance of the prohibition—the specific owner acts marked out 
for censure by spite law—also appears plain and intuitive. As quoted in the 
Introduction, when first recognizing spite as a basis for challenging an 
owner’s act, the Michigan court unequivocally announced in Burke v. 
Smith that nobody has a right to erect a structure for the purpose of injuring 
his neighbor.32 Other courts have used similar terms, forcefully depicting 
the spite prohibition they thereby introduced as based, as its name implies, 
on the owner’s motivation—prohibiting behavior intended solely to annoy 
a neighbor.33 That notion of spite doctrine has since become dogma. The 
 
30 See Nadav Shoked, The Duty to Maintain, 64 DUKE L.J. 437, 446–53 (2014). 
31 See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 16–18 (2000). 
32 37 N.W. 838, 842 (Mich. 1888). 
33 E.g., Hutcherson v. Alexander, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366, 369 (Ct. App. 1968) (“[E]ven a lawful use 
of one’s property may constitute a nuisance if it is part of a general scheme to annoy a neighbor and if 
the main purpose of the use is to prevent the neighbor from reasonable enjoyment of his own 
property.”); Hornsby v. Smith, 13 S.E.2d 20, 24 (Ga. 1941) (“Thus it is our opinion that malicious use 
of property resulting in injury to another is never a ‘lawful use,’ but is in every case unlawful. . . . When 
one acting solely from malevolent motives does injury to his neighbor, to call such conduct the exercise 
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leading treatise states as much,34 and so do the Restatement35 and the 
American Law Reports.36 Scholars of all methodological and normative 
stripes concur: spite is a prime example of the law “mak[ing] the 
entitlement to engage in a behavior depend on one’s reason for wishing to 
engage in it,”37 of the law “treat[ing] an act not otherwise wrongful as 
wrongful when it is motivated by enmity.”38 Writers conceive spite doctrine 
as straightforward: it applies a “motive test,” striking down acts prompted 
by disfavored intentions.39 
Yet it is this straightforward nature of the doctrine that also renders it 
unique among the doctrines employed to arbitrate conflicts between 
neighbors. Other such doctrines detail attributes a party’s act must count—
for example, adverse possession grants title to that party which possessed 
land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely for a statutorily set 
period of time.40 Or they appraise the harm the act inflicts; for example, 
nuisance law bars a party from substantially and unreasonably interfering 
with another’s use of land.41 Such doctrines might, on occasion, inquire into 
the actor’s knowledge of his act or its harms—for example, some 
jurisdictions require that the adverse possessor mistakenly believe the land 
to be his,42 and negligence liability requires actionable harm to be 
 
of an absolute legal right is a perversion of terms. . . . The use of one’s own property for the sole 
purpose of injuring another is not a right that a good citizen would desire nor one that a bad citizen 
should have.”). 
34 9 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 64.03[4], at 64-20 (Michael Allan Wolf 
ed., 2000) (“Where the defendant’s conduct is motivated solely by malice, the use is deemed 
unreasonable . . . .”). 
35 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 829 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“An intentional invasion of 
another’s interest in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable if the harm is significant and the 
actor’s conduct is (a) for the sole purpose of causing harm to the other; or (b) contrary to common 
standards of decency.”). 
36 Deborah Tussey, Annotation, Fence as Nuisance, 80 A.L.R.3d 962, § 2[a], at 967 (1977) (“The 
importance of the factor of malicious motive in the erection of a fence which harms or harasses a third 
party, usually an adjoining landowner, has caused much litigation and given rise to a diversity of 
viewpoints among courts of different jurisdictions. . . . The courts in other jurisdictions have adopted 
the view, which seems to be emerging as the dominant one, that fences which are erected from 
malicious motives are subject to abatement or other appropriate remedies where they cause injury.”). 
37 Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1454 (2009). 
38 Ward Farnsworth, The Economics of Enmity, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 211, 234 (2002). 
39 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 
8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 97 (1979); Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 
1667–68. (2011); Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REV. 
421, 448 (1992); Lee J. Strang, Damages as the Appropriate Remedy for “Abuse” of an Easement: 
Moving Toward Consistency, Efficiency, and Fairness in Property Law, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 933, 
960 (2008). 
40 E.g., Snook v. Bowers, 12 P.3d 771, 781–82 (Alaska 2000). 
41 E.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 669, 696–97 (Cal. 1996). 
42 E.g., Carpenter v. Ruperto, 315 N.W.2d 782, 786 (Iowa 1982). 
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predictable.43 But the focus of all these doctrines is always the act and its 
harm. 
The act’s motivation is never considered. For determining an actor’s 
liability in private litigation, intentions are supposedly irrelevant. A famous 
maxim of the common law holds that “[m]alicious motives make a bad act 
worse, but they cannot make that a wrong which in its own essence is 
lawful.”44 Property law is even more sanguine in its refusal to ponder 
motives. As Justice Holmes once explained, while in many legal fields an 
act’s legitimacy may depend on the actor’s goal, that is not the case where 
the act challenged is a use of land.45  
The doctrine of spite, grounded as it seemingly is in a motive test, 
plainly flies in the face of this assertion. It is thus a conspicuous exception 
to the general patterns of property law. As such, it has always induced 
scholarly interest. 
This inevitable attention the doctrine of spite garners has recently 
grown further still, thanks to developments in the theoretical literature. 
Influential authors have begun to argue that spite must be conceived as 
more than mere exception to the overall structure and priorities of property 
law. Instead, they find it emblematic of that structure and those priorities. If 
property law’s logic is accurately perceived, they argue, spite, as a doctrine 
explicitly relying on a motive test, is not unique but pivotal. For them spite 
represents a broader, indeed all-encompassing, restriction on owners’ 
rights. That restriction is the principle of abuse of right. 
B.  Spite and the Abuse of Right Principle 
The abuse of right principle is best illustrated by a celebrated French 
case.46 Adolphe Clément-Bayard and Jules Coquerel were neighbors.47 
Clément-Bayard constructed on his land a hangar to store his airship.48 
Coquerel constructed on his land tall iron spikes to interfere with Clément-
Bayard’s attempts at flying.49 When Clément-Bayard sought to have them 
 
43 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“In order that an act 
may be negligent it is necessary that the actor should realize that it involves a risk of causing harm to 
some interest of another . . . .”). 
44 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE 
INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 690 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1879); see also Allen v. Flood, 
[1898] AC 1 (HL) 92 (appeal taken from Eng.) (“[T]he existence of a bad motive, in the case of an act 
which is not in itself illegal, will not convert that act into a civil wrong for which reparation is due.”). 
45 Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904). 
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removed, Coquerel argued that the spikes merely expressed his right to use 
his own land.50 Nonetheless, the French court ruled against him in 1915.51 It 
reckoned that by building a structure whose purpose was to injure his 
neighbor, Coquerel abused his property right.52 And no property owner, 
proclaimed the court, is entitled to abuse his property right.53 
Since the early twentieth century,54 the doctrine announced in this case 
has been ingrained into civil systems’ property law.55 European officials 
still argue that it plays a basic, and vital, role in private law by assuring that 
law dispenses “true justice.”56 For all its centrality in European law, 
however, the doctrine has never been endorsed by an American 
lawmaker.57 A staple of civil law thinking, it remains markedly absent from 
the common law thinking. This contrast constitutes a key distinction 
between the idea of property in the common law and the civil law’s notion 
of property.58 
 
50 See id. This right was based on Articles 544 and 552 of the Code civil. CODE CIVIL [C. 
CIV.][CIVIL CODE] arts. 544, 552 (Fr.). 
51 Cour de Cassation [Cass.][Supreme Court for Judicial Matters], Aug. 3, 1915, D.P. I 1917, 79. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 The doctrine can be traced to two cases decided almost at the same time by two different French 
courts, Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Colmar, 1e civ., May 2, 1855, D.P. II 1856, 9 
(regarding the matter of Doerr against Keller), and Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Lyon, 
1e civ., Apr. 18, 1856, D.P. II 1856, 199 (regarding the commune of Saint-Galmier in the matter of 
Badoit against André). 
55 See, e.g., CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 833 (It.), translated in 3 THE ITALIAN CIVIL 
CODE AND COMPLEMENTARY LEGISLATION 5 (Mario Beltramo et al. trans., 2007) (“The owner cannot 
perform acts that have no other purpose than that of harming or causing annoyance to others.”); 
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], AUG. 18, 1896, § 226 (Ger.), translated in THE 
GERMAN CIVIL CODE: TRANSLATED AND ANNOTATED WITH AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION AND 
APPENDICES 51 (Chung Hui Wang trans., 1907) (“The exercise of a right which can only have the 
purpose of causing injury to another is unlawful.”); BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BW] [CIVIL CODE] art. 
3:13(1) (Neth.), translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE NETHERLANDS 435 (Hans Warendorf et al. trans., 
2009) (“The holder of a right may not exercise it to the extent that its exercise constitute an abuse.”). 
See generally Michael Byers, Abuse of Rights: An Old Principle, a New Age, 47 MCGILL L.J. 389 
(2002) (examining the doctrine’s origin and significance). 
56 See Catherine Lalumiere, Sec’y Gen. of the Council of Eur., Speech at the Nineteenth Colloquy 
on European Law (Nov. 1989), in ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND EQUIVALENT CONCEPTS 9, 10 (Council of 
Eur. ed., 1990). 
57 See Byers, supra note 55, at 395. Louisiana, a civil law system, may count as an exception. A.N. 
Yiannopoulos, Civil Liability for Abuse of Right: Something Old, Something New . . ., 54 LA. L. REV. 
1173, 1173 (1994). The common law case usually cited as rejecting the theory is Mayor of Bradford v. 
Pickles, [1895] AC 587 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.). For a discussion of the case, see infra note 102 
and accompanying text. 
58 See H.C. Gutteridge, Abuse of Rights, 5 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 22, 30, 43–44 (1933); Richard 
O’Sullivan, Abuse of Rights, 8 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 61, 65, 71–73 (1955) (“In France, it seems that 
the doctrine of Abus des Droits finds its model if not its source in the détournement de pouvoir of 
French administrative law. It is not politic in England to waste too much sympathy on public local 
authorities and ministerial departments.”). 
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Unless, that is, the contrast is mere formality. And for many recent 
authors, that is precisely its nature—due to the doctrine of spite. While 
American law, unlike its European counterpart, never explicitly adopted the 
doctrine of abuse of right, it has, they argue, imported it under a different 
label: spite law.59 Judicial pronouncements give credence to this claim. 
Although American judges scrupulously refrained from referring to the 
abuse of right doctrine by name, the early courts recognizing spite 
repeatedly cited the practices of European jurisprudence as models for 
prohibiting misuses of an owner’s freedom. In Burke v. Smith, the judges 
instituting the spite rule asserted that the civil law’s approach should 
inspire the common law since it recognizes in this regard the “moral law.”60 
Another court adopting spite doctrine two decades later went further to 
claim that it was banning spite to bring to these shores a European doctrine, 
for: 
On this subject, if need be, we will do better to follow the pandects of the 
heathen Romans, whose jurists have inculcated a doctrine more consistent 
with the teachings of Him whom they permitted to be crucified, than to be 
governed by the principles of the common law as expounded by some 
Christian courts and text writers.61 
Thereafter, for more than a hundred years now, American spite has 
supposedly amounted to the “functional equivalent” of the European abuse 
of right doctrine.62 So much so that some contend that though originating in 
the civil law, the abuse of right doctrine “took root in the common law 
legal systems.”63 The prohibition on spite embodies, we are told, the wider 
civil law category of abuse of right—of actions normally permitted but 
 
59 Joseph M. Perillo, Abuse of Rights: A Pervasive Legal Concept, 27 PAC. L.J. 37, 40 (1995); 
James Charles Smith, Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Law of Neighbors, 39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 757, 775–76 (2011). 
60 37 N.W. 838, 839–40 (Mich. 1888). 
61 Barger v. Barringer, 66 S.E. 439, 442 (N.C. 1909). 
62 Anna di Robilant, Abuse of Rights: The Continental Drug and the Common Law, 61 HASTINGS 
L.J. 687, 696 (2010). 
63 E.g., Amnon Lehavi, The Dynamic Law of Property: Theorizing the Role of Legal Standards, 
42 RUTGERS L.J. 81, 136 (2010). Commentators argue that the same process took place in other 
common law systems. In England, spite supposedly served as a replacement for abuse of right in late 
nineteenth-century common law. See MICHAEL TAGGART, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND ABUSE OF RIGHTS 
IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND 65 (2002); G.H.L. Fridman, Motive in the English Law of Nuisance, 40 VA. L. 
REV. 583, 586 (1954) (noting that intentional nuisance is central to the discussion of abuse of rights in 
the common law). The same has been said in Canada. Hamar Foster, Note, Abuse of Rights—Civil 
Law—Legal Reasoning: Bradford v. Pickles Revisited, 8 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 343, 348–50 (1973) 
(“[I]n so far as a malicious or improper motive is relevant to the determination of a legal right in our 
law, we probably will now reach the same result as those jurisdictions which have the doctrine [of 
abuse of rights].”).  
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prohibited when motivated by malice alone.64 Spite explicitly and directly 
targets “animus” situations and hence it has proven a convenient, and 
uncontroversial, conduit for injecting the abuse of right doctrine into the 
common law.65 Consequently, as one scholar observed, the common law 
lacks the proclamations against unjust abuse of rights typical of continental 
codes, yet “it should not be thought that the common law provides no 
remedy for such wrongs. There is ample provision in the present law . . . 
for the control of activities envisaged by the continental codes.”66 Similarly, 
a recent, and prominent, article argues that while the common law formally 
spurned the European general tort of abuse of right, “[w]hat we see instead 
is a role for a principle of abuse of . . . right.”67 
The presence of this principle, expressed and enforced by the spite 
prohibition, is important not merely because it bridges the gap between 
common law jurisprudence and civil law jurisprudence. For many writers it 
is key because it unveils a fundamental quality of property in American 
law.68 The legal system’s recognition of a principle of abuse of right 
implies a certain view of the powers of the owner, a view deviating from 
that traditionally ascribed to the common law. The common law has always 
been associated with an expansive reading of the owner’s powers.69 While 
English adages celebrating the owner as holder of absolute powers were 
pronounced outdated more than a century ago,70 many still believe that in 
 
64 Strang, supra note 39, at 960. 




66 Fridman, supra note 63, at 586. Some argue that results reached elsewhere through the abuse of 
right doctrine are accomplished in American law through tools beyond spite, such as equity or, in some 
states, prima facie torts. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Rose’s Human Nature of Property, 19 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 1047, 1049–51 (2011) (discussing equity); Farnsworth, supra note 38, at 235–36 
(discussing prima facie torts). 
67 Katz, supra note 15, at 1449. For a persuasive critique of this attempt to extend the abuse of right 
principle beyond “animus” (or spite) situations, see Fennell, supra note 65, at 61. 
68 See, e.g., Katz, supra note 15, at 1448. 
69 Julio Cueto-Rua, Abuse of Rights, 35 LA. L. REV. 965, 967 (1975) (“In England and the United 
States, a different attitude has prevailed. What may be called rather a strict interpretation of ownership 
and contractual rights has led the courts to accept, and to provide judicial protection to, actions taken by 
owners . . . .”). 
70 The most famous adage was made by Blackstone, who defined property as “that sole and 
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total 
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.” 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *2. With the rise of realism, this position was just as famously critiqued by Wesley 
Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE 
L.J. 16, 28–59 (1913). During the twentieth century, Hohfeld’s theory became conventional wisdom. 
See Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69 (J. Roland 
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980). 
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the common law, those powers that the owner does hold are interpreted 
broadly.71 Hence once an owner has a property right respecting others, he 
can enforce that right against all others.72 That is, he need not explain to 
others his reasons for using his right.73 
The existence of an abuse of right principle undermines this traditional 
argument about American property law. By imposing such a principle 
through spite doctrine the law clearly states that the holder of a right is not 
automatically entitled to use it for any purpose he desires. As the right 
cannot be abused, the owner may only use it for certain reasons: those the 
law recognizes as legitimate.74 In the eyes of many, this requirement that 
the owner’s goals correspond to the goals the law has set for ownership 
complicates the common law’s notion of property. It transforms, so it has 
been argued, ownership into a form of office holding.75 Alternatively, and 
perhaps more modestly, it has been characterized as concretizing an anti-
opportunism norm affixed into property law.76  
The specific details of these innovative accounts of property raise 
engrossing philosophical and normative questions, many of which will be 
engaged later in Part III, where the justifications for condemning spite will 
be examined—and challenged. Regardless of their substantive merit, 
however, these new descriptions of ownership have amplified the 
significance of the legal category of spite for theoretical discussions of 
property. These works revise our understanding of property because they 
judge spite to incarnate, or at least manifest, a broader principle of abuse of 
right. Once the role of that principle in the law is acknowledged, these 
writers explain, the legitimacy of an owner’s act can no longer be imagined 
as derived only from his powers as owner. It is also tied to the legitimacy 
of his motives. 
Always a source of fascination as an exception to the general patterns 
of property law, the role spite plays in debates over property theory has 
thereby expanded now that it is fashioned as outlining those patterns. This 
transformation in scholarly attitude has been reached following a 
 
71 See, e.g., J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 29–30, 34, 65–66 (1996); J.E. Penner, The 
“Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 737 (1996). 
72 For a discussion of the in rem nature of property rights, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. 
Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001). 
73 Avihay Dorfman, Private Ownership and the Standing to Say So, 64 U. TORONTO L.J. 402, 403 
(2014). 
74 See Katz, supra note 15, at 1450–51. 
75 Larissa Katz, Governing Through Owners: How and Why Formal Private Property Rights 
Enhance State Power, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2029, 2043–45 (2012). 
76 See Smith, supra note 66, at 1050 (arguing that through equity the common law imposes the anti-
opportunism norm, which in the civil law is embodied in the abuse of right concept). 
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reevaluation of the patterns of property law—not of spite law. The reading 
of that doctrine has remained constantly stable. Indeed, it is this traditional 
story of spite that makes the doctrine’s current equation with an abuse of 
right principle tenable. New commentators and old commentators, judges 
and thinkers, have always concurred: spite introduces a subjective test, 
scrutinizing the owner’s goal before condoning his act. Unfortunately, as 
will be established next, they are all simply wrong. 
II. AMERICAN SPITE: SPITE’S ACTUAL HISTORY AND ROLE IN 
AMERICAN LAW 
Part I reviewed the current understanding of spite, highlighting its 
theoretical prominence. As seen, spite is perceived as a prohibition against 
owners acting on their lands to aggrieve their neighbors rather than to 
benefit themselves. Any act an owner may otherwise engage in on her land 
will be banned if her motive for engaging in the act is deplorable. This 
reading consists of two elements: (1) the prohibition on spite is general, 
and (2) it revolves around mental states.77 This Part will investigate the 
history and function of spite in American law and conclude that neither of 
these two elements survives scrutiny. 
The current reading’s first element—the assertion some make to the 
effect that the prohibition on spite is general—is disproved by the fractured 
American story of spite. As reported in Part I, commentators and courts 
have been prone to majestic pronouncements to the effect that “malicious 
use of property resulting in injury to another is never a ‘lawful use.’”78 
Such rhetoric has never been backed, however, by legal action. When 
deciding cases where owners maliciously used property resulting in injury 
to another, courts generally ruled for the offending owners, stating 
repeatedly that a counterparty’s motives cannot form the basis for founding 
a right.79 Thus, in examples spanning the centuries, courts refused to find a 
cause of action when owners placed cameras to survey and annoy 
neighbors;80 sealed emergency exits and disconnected water lines supplying 
 
77 E.g., Hornsby v. Smith, 13 S.E.2d 20, 24 (Ga. 1941) (“We know of no statute or other rule of law 
in this State that confers upon an individual a right to maliciously injure another, regardless of what 
method may be employed to inflict such injury.” (emphasis added)).  
78 Id. 
79 See, e.g., Kuzniak v. Kozminski, 65 N.W. 275, 276 (Mich. 1895); Allen v. Kinyon, 1 N.W. 863, 
865 (Mich. 1879); Hunt v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 583, 591 (1854); Glendon Iron Co. v. Uhler, 75 Pa. 467, 
471 (1874); S. Royalton Bank v. Suffolk Bank, 27 Vt. 505, 508 (1854). 
80 Schiller v. Mitchell, 828 N.E.2d 323, 325–26 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). But see Blevins v. Sorrell, 
589 N.E.2d 438, 439–40 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (appearing to find a cause of action in a similar situation, 
but not detailing that cause or a reasoning). 
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neighbors’ sprinkler system to force them to sell;81 cut off neighbors’ gas 
supply wantonly;82 or, in myriad cases, constructed buildings to spite their 
neighbors in varied ways,83 sometimes keeping the building in a vile state,84 
at other times erecting it at an objectionable size,85 or with a cheap 
character,86 and at still other times endowing it with a particularly offensive 
design element.87 In all these instances affronted neighbors’ lawsuits failed. 
Throughout the last two hundred years courts would only penalize a 
malicious property use if that type of use fell into one of the very few 
categories of uses to which spite law applied. 
Spite is recognized, or was recognized at some time, in four lone 
property law subfields as grounds for enjoining a property use: water law 
(the “spite well”), land use (the “spite fence”), support rights, and restraints 
on alienation. This Part will review the history of spite in each of these four 
subfields in this order, which corresponds to the chronological sequence of 
spite’s legal appearance. The subfields of support rights and restraints on 
alienation will be discussed jointly since, in both, references to spite rarely 
went beyond dicta. 
The findings will show that in the two subfields where spite did play a 
major role—water law and land use—spite followed similar paths. It was 
introduced by courts (or, on rarer occasions, legislatures) struggling with a 
common law rule affording the owner absolute freedom of action. Courts 
grew doubtful of that rule’s wisdom, but, for diverse practical reasons, 
were first unwilling to renounce it. Hence they maintained the rule, but 
supplemented it with a spite exception. Though nominally entailing an 
examination of the owner’s intent when acting, in reality this exception 
inserted into legal analysis an objective balancing of the costs and benefits 
of the owner’s act. In this manner, the spite exception served to spell the 
demise of the absolute-owner-freedom rule and to announce the arrival of a 
balancing test. Once, in due course, such a test was fully instated in the 
relevant subfield—water law or land use—the spite exception lost its 
utility, and, as a legal doctrine, fizzled out. In the other two subfields—
support rights and restraints on alienation—where, to begin with, spite 
amounted to merely a minor legal element, it inevitably followed a more 
attenuated version of this pattern. But there, too, it never instituted a 
 
81 Randall v. Federated Retail Holdings, Inc., 429 F.3d 784, 786, 788–89 (8th Cir. 2005). 
82 McCune v. Norwich City Gas Co., 30 Conn. 521, 524 (1862).  
83 E.g., Biber v. O’Brien, 32 P.2d 425, 428–29 (Cal. 1934); Kuzniak, 65 N.W. at 276. 
84 White v. Bernhart, 241 P. 367, 368 (Idaho 1925) (the spiteful moving of a dilapidated building). 
85 Falloon v. Schilling, 29 Kan. 292, 295–96 (1883). 
86 Id. 
87 Hawkins v. Sanders, 8 N.W. 98, 98 (Mich. 1881) (discussing an awning). 
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meaningful motive-based criterion to assess owners’ activities. This 
common characteristic of the four histories of spite to be unraveled now 
upends the second element in spite law’s conventional reading: the maxim 
that spite has served to inject a subjective test into property law by 
prohibiting owners from acting when their intent is solely to harm others. 
A. Spite in Water Law 
Water law was the first property subfield to carve out a special rule for 
spiteful acts. Specifically, spite became a meaningful category in 
nineteenth-century cases stipulating landowners’ rights to percolating 
waters.88 These waters are located underneath the land and, since they 
represent a valuable resource, the landowner often seeks to pump them.89 
Until the nineteenth century’s middle decades, the common law lacked 
rules regulating owners’ rights to these desirable waters. The lacuna is 
surprising, since the nature of underground water renders conflicts over its 
use inevitable.90 As one of the first courts to confront a percolating waters 
problem explained, “[W]ater, like air, is of such a nature that no one can 
have an exclusive right in it. . . . The right of each is more or less dependent 
upon that of his neighbour.”91 Like air, water travels. If an owner digs a 
well on her land and pumps water, her neighbor will have less water 
flowing under her land, and thus a lessened ability to pump water herself. 
Water is also hardly traceable. Since the water located under the owner’s 
land today was under her neighbor’s land yesterday, and will be under 
another neighbor’s land tomorrow, declaring the landowner the water’s 
owner is pointless.92 Law thus never consistently assigned property rights in 
percolating waters in this fashion.93 Instead, it regulated owners’ ability to 
 
88 Other cases covered by water law are those involving streams and surface water. 
89 Due to early and unsophisticated science, underground water fell into one of two categories in 
the common law. Waters either formed part of underground known streams, whence they were subject 
to the legal regime applicable to surface streams, or their underwater source was unknown, in which 
case they were defined as percolating and were governed by the rules discussed here. Nourse v. 
Andrews, 255 S.W. 84, 86 (Ky. 1923). The presumption was that underground waters are percolating, 
unless shown to be supplied by a known stream. Barclay v. Abraham, 96 N.W. 1080, 1081 (Iowa 1903). 
90 As late as 1902, the California court incredulously complained that the doctrine had not 
developed much and that not enough had been written about percolating water in casebooks. Katz v. 
Walkinshaw, 70 P. 663, 665 (Cal. 1902), rev’d on reh’g, 74 P. 766 (Cal. 1903). A year later a treatise 
writer also observed that, “The law with respect to rights in percolating waters was not developed until 
a comparatively recent period.” 3 HENRY PHILIP FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 
§ 935, at 2710 (1903). 
91 Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528, 533 (1855). 
92 See Canada v. City of Shawnee, 64 P.2d 694, 699 (Okla. 1936). 
93 The terminology courts historically used is slightly more nuanced. Since the common law 
prioritized possession over ownership, the landowner would be treated as the water’s owner if she 
possessed it. The landowner could not be viewed as possessing the water underneath her soil until she 
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draw such waters.94 That is, rather than deigning the landowner as the 
owner of the water underneath her land, the law designated the landowner 
who brought water to the surface as the owner of the withdrawn waters. 
Hence, the legal question in percolating water law is this: to what extent 
does a landowner hold the right to withdraw waters from underneath her 
land so as to thereby become their owner? 
The common law’s original answer was simple: to a limitless extent. 
The first English court to adjudicate such a dispute stated, in the 1843 case 
of Acton v. Blundell,95 that the landowner enjoyed an absolute privilege to 
draw water, regardless of any interference with other landowners’ ability to 
draw water.96 The decision was almost immediately quoted in approval by 
American courts.97 Indeed, the Massachusetts court had reached the same 
conclusion even earlier, in 1836.98 The rule became known as the Acton 
Rule, and for a few decades, its application or wisdom was hardly 
questioned.99 The rationale cited was underground waters’ singularly 
opaque character.100 Unlike water flowing through streams, the source and 
path of water percolating underground were unknowable.101 Hence, unlike 
rules governing surface stream waters, which required courts to intervene 
and fairly distribute use rights between neighbors, the rule respecting 
percolating waters could do no more than leave each owner free to pump. 
As any regulatory scheme for underground water was unworkable, the 
Acton Rule could admit no exceptions. The English courts clarified as 
 
actually physically took possession by pumping it. Hence the landowner did not hold ownership in the 
water, but rather, by reason of her ownership of land touching the water, she held rights of use, which, 
as against those not owning such land, are in large measure exclusive. See the discussion in 1 SAMUEL 
WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES §§ 711–12, at 779–81 (3d ed. 1911). 
94 For example, the Idaho statute adopted in 1899 provides that the right in water acquired by 
appropriating water is “[t]he right to the use.” Act of Feb. 25, 1899, H.B. No. 183, § 2, 1899 Idaho Sess. 
Laws 380 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE § 42-103 (2015)). The code also provides “the right to 
the use of . . . waters . . . shall not be considered as being a property right in itself . . . .” IDAHO CODE 
§ 42-101 (2015). 
95 (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 1223; 12 M. & W. 324. 
96 Id. at 1235; 12 M. & W. at 353–54. 
97 See, e.g., Hanson v. McCue, 42 Cal. 303, 309–10 (1871); City of Greencastle v. Hazelett, 23 Ind. 
186, 189 (1864); New Albany & Salem R.R. v. Peterson, 14 Ind. 112, 114 (1860); Frazier v. Brown, 
12 Ohio St. 294, 311 (1861), overruled by Cline v. Am. Aggregates Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 
1984); Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528, 532–34 (1855). Nineteenth-century treatise writers listed the 
rule as a given. See, e.g., COOLEY, supra note 44, at 690; JOHN GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
WATERS, INCLUDING RIPARIAN RIGHTS, AND PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN WATERS TIDAL AND 
INLAND § 280 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1883); JOHN B. MINOR, 3 INSTITUTES OF COMMON AND 
STATUTE LAW 18 (Richmond, 2d ed. 1876). 
98 Greenleaf v. Francis, 35 Mass. 117, 123 (1836). 
99 See Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533, 541–43 (1850); Ellis v. Duncan, 21 Barb. 230, 235 (N.Y. 
Gen. Term 1855); Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514, 519 (1863). 
100 E.g., Roath, 20 Conn. at 541; Frazier, 12 Ohio St. at 311; MINOR, supra note 97, at 18. 
101 Haldeman, 45 Pa. at 519. 
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much in the Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles case,102 where a landowner sunk 
a shaft to divert water away from springs on which the neighboring city 
relied.103 His goal was to force the city to buy his land or pay him for the 
water.104 Still, the English court decided that, because the Acton Rule was 
absolute, Pickles’s malicious—or extortionist—intent was irrelevant.105 
But while, as noted, American courts had almost unanimously adopted 
the Acton Rule,106 most rejected the Mayor of Bradford holding.107 They 
thereby created, for the first time in American law, a spite-based exception 
to a property rule. Yet the momentous arrival of spite on the scene of 
American law had surprisingly little to do with spite, and much to do with 
water law. The reasoning courts employed for introducing the spite 
exception evinces that the exception can only be understood against the 
broader context of courts’ growing disaffection with the rule granting 
owners an absolute privilege to draw percolating waters, rather than 
disaffection with malevolent well diggers.108 
As the nineteenth century progressed, more and more American courts 
were struck by the Acton Rule’s rigidity. The rule was exceptional: in all 
other property law subfields—including other elements of the law 
governing water—an owner’s right could be adjusted to protect 
neighbors.109 Such adjustments were necessary, the Pennsylvania court 
explained in a percolating water case, since: 
The beneficent Being who created the earth, and gave man dominion over it, 
imposed on him the duty of doing to others as he would that they should do to 
him. Upon this high moral obligation rests the legal one which requires every 
 
102 [1895] AC 587 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.). For a discussion of the case’s importance, see 
TAGGART, supra note 63. 
103 [1895] A.C. at 589. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 591–92. 
106 New Hampshire represented the exception. See infra note 150 and accompanying text. 
107 See, e.g., Brown & Bros. v. Illius, 27 Conn. 84, 96 (1858); Springfield Waterworks Co. v. 
Jenkins, 62 Mo. App. 74, 82 (1895); Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 46 N.Y.S. 141, 144–45 (App. Div. 
1897); Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528, 535–36 (1855). 
108 See W.L. Summers, Property in Oil and Gas, 29 YALE L.J. 174, 175 (1919) (noting courts’ 
disaffection with the Acton Rule they were applying). An early twentieth-century treatise writer also 
noted as much. 3 HENRY FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 935, at 2710–13 
(1903). 
109 See Katz v. Walkinshaw, 70 P. 663, 666 (Cal. 1903) (“Proprietary rights are limited by the 
common interests of others . . . . This proposition is generally recognized, but for some reason has not 
always been recognized by the courts when considering the subject of percolating water, although all 
rights in respect to water are peculiarly within its province.”), rev’d on reh’g, 74 P. 766 (Cal. 1903); 
Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569, 575 (1862) (“[T]he injury [in both surface water and 
percolating water cases] is the same, produced in the same general way, and by the same cause, because 
of a difference, not in the nature or effects of the water, but merely in its immediate and not necessarily 
its ultimate source? Such distinctions and such results do not commend themselves to our judgment.”). 
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one so to use his own privileges as not to injure the rights of others. In all the 
relations of social life, it is the interest and duty of each to respect the 
privileges of others.110 
The Acton Rule was this duty’s opposite. And yet, unwillingly, the 
Pennsylvania court had to follow it, not for principled reasons, but for 
reasons of “public convenience.”111 The practical rationale behind the rule 
was irrefutable: “[T]he difficulty in ascertaining the fact of [a] violation [of 
the neighbor’s right to percolating water], as well as the extent of it, would 
be insurmountable.”112 
Percolating waters’ ways remained mysterious. The Pennsylvania 
court, alongside its peers, thus found itself in a predicament: it was 
enforcing a rule of whose fairness it entertained grave doubts, but whose 
practical underpinnings were undisputable.113 The specific problem 
presented by the English Mayor of Bradford case offered a convenient way 
out. While subterranean waters’ unknowable nature necessitated the 
otherwise unfortunate absolute privilege rule set in cases like Acton, it did 
not necessitate the refusal to recognize an intent-based exception in cases 
like Mayor of Bradford. Courts could not discern the nature and flow of 
underground percolating waters; they supposedly could, however, discern 
the nature and flow of owners’ motives.114 Through this reasoning, most, 
though not all,115 American courts instituted a spite exception to the Acton 
Rule.116 
For the first time, spite was recognized as carrying legal repercussions 
in American property law. As formally announced, the malicious intent 
exception to the Acton Rule would bar an owner from digging a “spite 
well”: a neighbor, normally powerless to stop the owner from drawing 
water, could halt her if the owner dug the well with the specific purpose of 
harming that neighbor. The spite exception was to oblige courts to 
 
110 Wheatley, 25 Pa. at 535. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 532. 
113 E.g., Ellis v. Duncan, 21 Barb. 230, 234–35 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1855); see also Wiggins v. Brazil 
Coal & Clay Corp., 452 N.E.2d 958, 966 (Ind. 1983) (explaining that by the late nineteenth century the 
only remaining rationale for the rule was “to relieve courts of the responsibility of decision making 
during an era when there was little scientific knowledge regarding hydrology”). 
114 See Wheatley, 25 Pa. at 535. 
115 A few courts insisted on spite’s irrelevance. E.g., Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 311–12 
(1861), overruled by Cline v. Am. Aggregates Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 1984); Chatfield v. Wilson, 
28 Vt. 49, 57 (1855); Huber v. Merkel, 94 N.W. 354, 356 (Wis. 1903), overruled by State v. Michels 
Pipeline Constr., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 339 (Wis. 1974). 
116 See Summers, supra note 108, at 175–76 (noting that spite became the rule’s most prominent 
exception). By analogy, one court applied this approach to disputes over oil, banning a spite oil well. 
Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guar. Oil Co., 82 So. 206, 211–12 (1919). 
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investigate the digging owner’s motivations. Yet from the time of its 
introduction, courts did not actually treat the exception as opportunity to 
engage in such analysis. Other than in one case, findings about the owner’s 
intent never grounded a ruling respecting a well’s spiteful nature.117 Instead, 
a court’s conclusion that spite was present in, or absent from, the 
defendant’s decision to dig was reached following a comparison of the 
social utility of the defendant’s use of the water to the social utility of the 
plaintiff’s use. The Pennsylvania ruling first instituting the spite exception 
is illustrative. Rather than exploring the defendant mining company’s 
subjective motivations, it compared mining’s social worth to the social 
worth of the plaintiff’s use of the disputed waters for his tannery 
business.118  
Such sidestepping of intent tests is most glaring in cases where 
subjective spite’s presence was unquestionable. In one Virginia case, the 
litigants were neighbors operating competing resorts.119 They had 
previously been embroiled in lengthy and acrimonious boundary disputes, 
focusing on a water source straddling their lots’ border.120 After courts had 
ruled that the source belonged to the plaintiff, the defendant decided to 
draw the water away through a pump interfering with the water’s course.121 
The court accepted the plaintiff’s evidence that the defendant was 
motivated by malice when installing the pump;122 still it ruled that the 
Acton Rule’s spite exception was of no avail. The findings respecting the 
defendant’s actual spite were “irrelevant.”123 The only finding that mattered 
was that he was not wasting the water.124 
In another extreme case,125 where the plaintiff actually prevailed, the 
analysis proceeded similarly. The defendant had placed a pump on land 
adjoining his former employer’s land.126 He instructed the installers, “I 
want you to get me a good pump and put in there, and I will sink old Pluto 
[his neighbor’s spring] to hell.”127 Once the pump was in place, and after he 
had learned that the plaintiff’s spring had ceased to flow, the defendant 
 
117 The sole exception is St. Amand v. Lehman, 47 S.E. 949 (Ga. 1904). But the case dealt with 
streaming water not subject to the Acton Rule to begin with.  
118 Wheatley, 25 Pa. at 535–36. 
119 Miller v. Black Rock Springs Imp. Co., 40 S.E. 27, 27 (Va. 1901). 
120 Id.  
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 29. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 32. 
125 Gagnon v. French Lick Springs Hotel Co., 72 N.E. 849 (Ind. 1904). 
126 Id. at 850. 
127 Id. at 851. 
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rejoiced, “We have got her down; she has gone to hell,” and thereafter 
announced to the plaintiff, “We are pumping you dry. We will make you 
break your back dipping after that water.”128 In the ensuing litigation, the 
Indiana court ruled for the plaintiff relying on the spite exception to the 
Acton Rule, but it did not base the decision on the defendant’s spiteful 
statements; rather the determinative factor was the finding that the 
defendant was drawing waters “without a real necessity therefor.”129 
In other cases as well, the subjective inquiry into the owner’s intent 
that the spite exception supposedly mandated was transformed into an 
objective exploration into the social worth of the owner’s use of the 
contested waters. Ostensibly employing the spite exception, courts 
diverged from the strict Acton Rule to block owners from pumping water 
and selling it,130 putting the water to “artificial” rather than “natural” uses,131 
or exhausting all the water from land in the vicinity.132 
Most commonly, as in the Virginia and Indiana cases cited, spite was 
invoked to stop owners from digging wells and wasting the water 
procured.133 Indeed, in the era’s decisions, the term spite subtly morphed 
into the term waste.134 As one court announced in a case where the 
defendant diverted water from underneath her neighbor’s land into an 
unused creek: “[T]he intent with which [the act was] exercised would be 
immaterial. . . . The important intimation to which we wish to direct 
attention is that with respect to the beneficial use.”135 Similarly, when a 
plaintiff was denied waters he had used to quench the city’s needs, the 
court, in reliance on the spite exception, ruled against the defendant who 
diverted said waters into a sewer, but not before announcing that the 
decision was made “irrespective and independent of [the defendant’s] 
motive.”136 The defendant’s motive—which the court admitted could easily 
be described as malicious137—was immaterial. What mattered was that the 
defendant wasted the water while the plaintiff was trying to put it to a 
 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 852. 
130 Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 46 N.Y.S. 141, 144, 148 (App. Div. 1897). 
131 Willis v. City of Perry, 60 N.W. 727, 729 (Iowa 1894). 
132 Forbell v. City of New York, 58 N.E. 644, 645–46 (N.Y. 1900). 
133 E.g., Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer, 93 N.W. 907, 908–09 (Minn. 1903). 
134 See Springfield Waterworks Co. v. Jenkins, 62 Mo. App. 74, 82 (1895); Pence v. Carney, 
52 S.E. 702, 705 (W. Va. 1905). 
135 Barclay v. Abraham, 96 N.W. 1080, 1082 (Iowa 1903). 
136 Stillwater, 93 N.W. at 909. 
137 Id. 
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valuable use.138 The spite exception to the Acton Rule was indifferent to the 
owner’s mental state; the owner “has no right to waste [the water], whether 
through malice or indifference.”139 
In disputes over percolating waters, the late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century courts, having introduced—for the first time in American 
history—spite as a meaningful legal category, developed a legal idea of 
spite sharing little with the common notion of spite, or with the spite 
exception’s purported goal. So much so that one lower court was scolded 
for basing an actionable spite finding on the defendant’s intent and his 
fraught relationship with the plaintiff.140 In accordance with the nature of 
the Acton Rule’s spite exception as explicated in previous cases, which 
never, the higher court insisted, were concerned with subjective spite, the 
lower court should have considered general social welfare, and “for reasons 
of public policy the plaintiff was precluded from asserting an act to be 
maliciously done.”141 
Such rulings came close to an overt avowal that spite law did not 
relate to spite, and one court indeed proceeded to affirm as much. Unable to 
ignore the reality, as opposed to the rhetoric, of prior decisions, the Iowa 
court in 1920 reached a startling—and for this Article’s discussion, 
remarkable—conclusion. It proclaimed that in law, spite did not mean 
spite. The court distinguished “express malice” from “malice in the law”; 
for the latter to exist, the former need not be present. Reading cases from 
Iowa and elsewhere, the court noted: 
That malice in law is referred to rather than express malice is made clear 
because, for instance, the diversion [of percolating water] has been held to be 
actionable where the harm was caused by negligence . . . . And [another case] 
strongly indicates that the fact that waste is being committed to the injury of 
another will of itself invoke the powers of the chancery court.142 
Due to this distinction, the Iowa court deemed the well it confronted in that 
case a spite well, despite malice’s absence.143 The defendant was using the 
water “to supply his hogs with drink and wallowing places, while the 
 
138 Id. at 908–09; see also Springfield Waterworks, 62 Mo. App. at 82–85 (enjoining the defendants 
from releasing water in order to make repairs to their pond, since those repairs could have been made at 
a different time at which the release of water would not divert a significant source of the plaintiff’s 
spring, used to provide the city of Springfield with water). 
139 Sycamore Coal Co. v. Stanley, 166 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Ky. 1942) (emphasis added); see also 
Ryan v. Quinlan, 124 P. 512, 516 (Mont. 1912) (explaining that a landowner can use water as he sees fit 
but “the use must be without malice or negligence”). 
140 Chesley v. King, 74 Me. 164, 169, 175–76 (1882). 
141 Id. at 173. 
142 De Bok v. Doak, 176 N.W. 631, 634 (Iowa 1920) (citations omitted). 
143 Id. 
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plaintiff is . . . urging his needs in supplying human beings with water.”144 
“The relative need and use” of the water, rather than the defendant’s intent, 
was spite’s test.145 
The attitude evinced by prior rulings led the Iowa court to question the 
soundness of the literal reading of the Acton Rule’s spite exception.146 
Elsewhere, that prevailing attitude led courts to question the soundness of 
the Acton Rule itself. In contrast to its notional basis, in practice the spite 
exception was a means of introducing into water allocation decisions a 
comparison of the social value of competing water uses. But if a balancing 
test was necessary in such decisions, why adhere to a rule granting the 
owner absolute freedom—the Acton Rule—and then subject it to an 
exception only furtively introducing such balancing? 
Unsurprisingly, for many, the spite qualification of the absolute 
ownership theory could not allay criticisms of the Acton Rule.147 Back in 
1862, the New Hampshire court had found the spite exception insufficient 
to remedy the Acton Rule’s injustice—a ban on spite wells, it reasoned, 
“seems anomalous under the theory [courts] adopt [i.e., the Acton Rule].”148 
The New Hampshire court thus spurned the Acton Rule altogether. It 
instituted a reasonable use standard: an owner did not have the absolute 
right to use percolating waters, only the right to use them in a reasonable 
manner, accounting for neighbors’ interests.149 At the time, as explained 
above, other courts shared the New Hampshire court’s concerns regarding 
the Acton Rule’s fairness, but they were reluctant to forthrightly adopt this 
alternative theory, judging themselves unqualified to balance different 
owners’ interests due to the limited understanding of percolating waters’ 
ways.150 
But science was not standing still. By the turn of the century the 




146 Id. at 633–34 (first citing Gagnon v. French Lick Springs Hotel Co., 72 N.E. 849 (Ind. 1904); 
then citing Springfield Waterworks Co. v. Jenkins, 62 Mo. App. 74 (1895); then citing Pence v. Carney, 
52 S.E. 702 (W. Va. 1905); then citing Barclay v. Abraham, 96 N.W. 1080 (Iowa 1903); and then citing 
Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer, 93 N.W. 907 (Minn. 1903)). 
147 Summers, supra note 108, at 175. 
148 Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569, 575 (1862). 
149 Id. at 577. 
150 See supra notes 111–12. The New Hampshire court was unimpressed by “the alleged difficulty 
of determining the direction and extent of percolation and drainage.” Bassett, 43 N.H. at 574. Instead, it 
thought “[i]n a large number of cases no such difficulty exists, and the remainder may be provided for 
consistently, and in accordance with settled legal principles.” Id. 
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dramatically.151 The judicial refusal to regulate percolating waters’ use was 
no longer easily justifiable by lack of expertise. Judges could now be 
furnished with data regarding the location and amount of percolating 
waters as necessary for fairly allocating those waters.152 Moreover, the 
absence of legal regulation was threatening social welfare, since the 
nation’s expanding population and incessant development generated acute 
water shortages, particularly in the arid west.153 Consequently, in state court 
after state court, the Acton Rule gave way to the New Hampshire 
reasonable use rule,154 which eventually became the majority rule—
christened the American Rule.155 
With the Acton Rule’s demise, the spite exception’s logic won the 
day. The exception itself, though, inevitably became superfluous. The 
exception, as seen, was premised not on the advisability of a mental state 
test, but on the desirability of the balancing of utilities. Once the rule for 
allocating water rights itself became reasonable use—i.e., the balancing of 
all owners’ interests—the need for a balancing-based exception to the rule 
ended. Accordingly, references to a spite exception disappeared from 
American water law by the twentieth century’s second quarter. Although 
officials were complaining that owners were drilling spite wells to harm 
 
151 State v. Michels Pipeline Const., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 339, 345 (Wis. 1974) (“Even in 1903 . . . , 
the awe of mysterious, unknowable forces beneath the earth was fast becoming an outmoded basis for a 
rule of law.”); see also Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 768–69 (Cal. 1903) (describing the physical 
condition of the state in explaining why the reasons for the Acton Rule no longer apply). Compare 
CLESSON S. KINNEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IRRIGATION § 49, at 70–71 (Washington, D.C., W.H. 
Lowdermilk & Co., 1894) (arguing earlier that the percolating water percolated through the ground in 
unknown channels), with FARNHAM, supra note 108, at 2711 (noting the difficulty in discerning the 
progress of underground water as the traditional explanation for the lack of regulation in the field, but 
concluding, in 1904, that “[t]here is no reason why the use of such water should not be brought within 
definite rules the same as any other class of property”). For an example of a contemporary court relying 
on expert opinions to settle a dispute over percolating water, see Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline, 
20 So. 780, 785 (Fla. 1896). 
152 Meeker v. City of East Orange, 74 A. 379, 384 (N.J. 1909) (arguing that courts justify the Acton 
Rule citing a difficulty to ascertain facts respecting underground water, but this difficulty is readily 
solved through expert evidence). 
153 See Katz, 74 P. at 768–69. 
154 E.g., id. at 773; Cason v. Fla. Power Co., 76 So. 535, 536 (Fla. 1917); Schenk v. City of Ann 
Arbor, 163 N.W. 109, 114 (Mich. 1917); Erickson v. Crookston Waterworks Power & Light Co., 
117 N.W. 435, 441 (Minn. 1908); Meeker, 74 A. at 385; Nashville, Chattanooga, & St. Louis Ry. v. 
Rickert, 89 S.W.2d 889, 896–97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1935); Patrick v. Smith, 134 P. 1076, 1079 (Wash. 
1913); see also WIEL, supra note 93, at § 1041, at 973 (“There is a steady trend of decision in America 
away from the English rule . . . .”). The reasonable use test varied between states. Mostly, it meant a 
prohibition on waste. Some used a correlative rights test, which one author argued was meaningfully 
different. Marion Rice Kirkwood, Appropriation of Percolating Water, 1 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (1948). 
155 Midway Irrigation Co. v. Snake Creek Mining & Tunnel Co., 271 F. 157, 162–63 (8th Cir. 
1921) (“The rule . . . may be said to be the American . . . rule.”); Horne v. Utah Oil Ref. Co., 202 P. 
815, 820 (Utah 1921) (“[W]hat is now known as the ‘American doctrine’ [is] the doctrine of 
‘reasonable use.’”). 
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neighbors as late as in 2011,156 courts no longer even mention spite as 
relevant to water disputes. 
This inaction is hardly surprising, as the presence of actual spite was 
never a real concern of courts; instead, courts were troubled by the 
presence of a water law rule thwarting the appraisal of water uses’ 
usefulness. By and large, that rule is no longer present in America. Thus 
from the late 1920s until this Article was written, spite, as a potential 
consideration in percolating waters disputes, was alluded to by only two 
state courts157—both members of the tiny minority of states still following 
the Acton Rule.158 Interestingly, in neither of these cases is spite seriously 
analyzed. Having rejected the American Rule’s balancing of utilities test, 
these state courts are apparently disinclined to engage in spite analysis, 
seeing that in water law, such analysis has always entailed not intent tests, 
but the balancing of utilities. 
Spite, as a meaningful legal category, enjoyed a brief heyday in water 
law. Unheard of before, and dormant thereafter, it was discussed in a flurry 
of decisions during the roughly three decades surrounding the twentieth 
century’s dawn. The rise and fall of the prohibition on spite wells shadows 
the rise and fall of the Acton Rule—the rule allowing owners free license to 
draw water regardless of effects on neighbors. Courts that were unhappy 
with that rule, but hesitant to formally opt for another due to the time’s 
scientific limitations, turned to a spite exception: an exception grounded in 
supposedly discernable intent, but in fact used to introduce the balancing of 
interests. Once scientific advances enabled courts to proceed to formally 
adopt a balancing rule, the need for this exception vanished. Importantly, 
throughout, the law of spite in the subfield of water law never concerned 
itself with mental states. This detachment set the pattern for spite’s function 
in other property subfields, as shall be seen next. 
 
156 VT. TECH. ADVISORY COMM., A REVIEW OF THE “OVERSHADOWING” OF WATER SUPPLY–
WASTEWATER SYSTEM ISOLATION DISTANCES 19, 23 (2010), http://drinkingwater.vt.gov/rotac/pdf/
2011.01.15.tacovershadowingrep.pdf [http://perma.cc/R33U-R5BN]; Me. Dep’t of Health and Human 
Servs., Position Paper: Maine Subsurface Wastewater Disposal Rules 10-144 CMR 241 (Jan. 18, 2011), 
http://www.maine.gov/dhhs/mecdc/environmental-health/plumb/documents/rules/swd-rules-position-
paper.doc [https://perma.cc/DNV8-BSGH]. 
157 See Maddocks v. Giles, 728 A.2d 150, 152 n.4 (Me. 1999); Fain v. Great Spring Waters of Am., 
Inc., 973 S.W.2d 327, 328–29 (Tex. App. 1998). 
158 Joseph W. Dellapenna, A Primer on Groundwater Law, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 265, 274 (2013) 
(“[The absolute dominion rule] perhaps survives to any real degree only in Indiana, Maine, and 
Texas.”). The Texas court has recently adopted the extreme position that the owner’s right to 
percolating waters is a property right, whose regulation may amount to an unconstitutional taking. 
Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 833 (Tex. 2012). 
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B. Spite in Land Use Law 
Water law’s restriction on spite wells was the first instance where 
American courts relied on spite to determine the rights of bickering 
neighbors, but the most prominent and commented upon instance is land 
use law’s restriction on malicious structures.159 Indeed, the example 
launching this Article broached spite in land use law. Unlike in water law, 
in land use the spite prohibition is still invoked today. Nonetheless, as this 
Section will show, spite in land use law followed the same trajectory as its 
counterpart in water law. Here too, the exception first emerged when the 
law afforded the owner absolute freedom of action. It permitted courts to 
moderate this freedom to account for public policy considerations, while 
still nominally adhering to the absolute freedom rule whose rationale 
persisted. As was the case in water law, once conditions changed in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries unsettling this rationale, the 
absolute freedom rule was displaced; and thus, the spite exception that had 
before tempered owners’ absolute freedom lost its role and ceased to 
evolve. In fact, spite’s story in land use exemplifies even more vividly than 
its water law peer this Part’s thesis that spite doctrine did not deal with 
subjective intent, but rather introduced objective restraints when the law 
formally afforded the owner absolute freedom. For in land use, spite went 
through a prehistory, during which courts explicitly denied that spite could 
carry legal weight—up until the moment when an absolute owner freedom 
rule was set in place. 
Disputes over structures owners build on their lands are some of the 
most common conflicts between neighbors. In the typical case, an owner 
builds a structure on her land that, since it is visible from her neighbor’s 
land, affects the latter’s views: limiting exposure to sun and vistas, or 
adding aesthetically unpleasing sights. Such disputes multiply as the 
environment grows crowded and as construction technologies improve. 
Hence, disputes over structures became a staple of American property law 
in the teeming nineteenth century. 
At first, when courts were faced with such disputes, they adopted an 
approach starkly different from the Acton Rule, the absolute owner 
privilege rule applied to water. The English common law settled land use 
disputes through the doctrine of “ancient lights.”160 A doctrine whose 
origins were murkier than often assumed, it held that an owner had the 
 
159 E.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 785 (8th ed. 2014); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, 
PROPERTY 139 (4th ed. 2014). 
160 See Herbert Pope, The English Common Law in the United States, 24 HARV. L. REV. 6, 26 
(1910). 
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right to the continued flow of light and air over neighboring land if he had 
been enjoying such exposure in the past.161 Originally this meant enjoyment 
since time immemorial162 (or from the time of Richard I, whichever came 
last),163 but later courts settled on the somewhat less prolonged period of 
twenty years.164 Thusly formulated, the rule dictated that if an owner 
created an opening for a window twenty or more years ago, her neighbor 
could not block that window’s views: through the passage of time, the 
owner had gained an easement for the passage of light and air over the 
neighbor’s land.165 If, on the other hand, windows were in existence for 
 
161 It was often claimed that the doctrine of “ancient lights” was formally adopted by the King’s 
Bench in the case of Darwin v. Upton, (1786) 85 Eng. Rep. 922, 927–28; 2 Wms. Saund. 172, 174 
n.(2), though beforehand it might have been a London custom. E.g., Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309, 318 
(N.Y. 1838) (“[T]he doctrine [of ancient lights] was not sanctioned . . . until 1786, when the case o [sic] 
Darwin v. Upton was decided by the K[ing’s] B[ench].”); EMORY WASHBURN, A TREATISE ON THE 
AMERICAN LAW OF EASEMENTS AND SERVITUDES 492 (Philadelphia, George W. Childs 1863) (“And it 
is said that, as a rule of law, [the right to light resulting from long enjoyment] never became settled in 
Westminster Hall until 1786 . . . .”). Presumably that late eighteenth-century decision reversed a 
centuries-old decision, Bury v. Pope, (1587) 78 Eng. Rep. 375; Cro. Eliz. 118, which had rejected the 
doctrine. But the decision in Darwin v. Upton is nowhere to be found, and references to it have always 
cited a later case, Yard v. Ford, (1669) 85 Eng. Rep. 922; 2 Wms. Saund. 172, which mentioned and 
summarized the ruling while addressing a different doctrinal issue. Moreover, it is unclear whether the 
case supposedly reversed by Darwin v. Upton actually rejected the doctrine of ancient lights. Bury v. 
Pope does state that “lights [that] have continued by the space of thirty or forty years” can be blocked 
by a neighbor. (1587) 78 Eng. Rep. 375, 375; Cro. Eliz. 118, 118. This result and reasoning did not 
necessarily foreclose on the possibility that lights that had continued for a period of time longer than 
thirty or forty years—namely, since time immemorial—could not be blocked. And indeed, the same 
case was also reported in another version, under the title Bowry v. Pope, (1587) 74 Eng. Rep. 155; 
1 Leo. 168, where the court explicitly stated that lights enjoyed through “an antient [sic] window time 
out of memory” could not be impaired. id. at 155; 1 Leo. 168. In this version of the case, the plaintiff’s 
claim was still denied, but not because owners had no right for the maintenance of ancient lights, but 
rather since that plaintiff’s window dated solely to the time of Queen Mary, still very much in memory 
during the reign of Queen Elizabeth (her successor) when the Bowry suit reached the court. I am 
particularly grateful to Peter Nascenzi, of the Northwestern University Law Review, for his help in 
conducting research for this note. 
162 Early cases apparently interpreted Bury v. Pope, discussed supra in note 161, as implying that 
ancient lights will be protected, if they have been enjoyed since “time out of mind.” See, e.g., Rosewell 
v. Prior (1696) 91 Eng. Rep. 396, 397; 2 Salkeld 459, 460 (holding that ancient lights “imports usage 
time out of mind”); Villers v. Ball (1689) 89 Eng. Rep. 412, 412 n.(a); 1 Show. K.B. 7, 7 n.(a); Newal 
v. Barnard (1612) 80 Eng. Rep. 812, 812–13; 1 Bulstrode 116, 116–17; Bland v. Moseley (1587) 
77 Eng. Rep. 817, 817 n.(B); 9 Co. Rep. 58a, 58a n.(B). 
163 Isaac F. Redfield, Recent English Decisions Upon Leading Questions, 11 AM. L. REG. 522, 523 
(1863). 
164 See Cross v. Lewis (1824) 107 Eng. Rep. 538, 538; 2 B. & C. 686, 686–87; Daniel v. North 
(1809) 103 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1047–48; 11 East. 372, 372–73; Yard v. Ford (1669) 85 Eng. Rep. 922, 
932–33 n.(2)(d); 2 Wms. Saund. 172, 175 n.(2)(d). Courts were influenced by an Act of Parliament 
from 1623 setting the prescription period at twenty years. See Gwathney v. Stump, 2 Tenn. (2 Overt.) 
308, 313 (1814) (describing the influence of acts of Parliament on the shortening of the time required 
for finding a prescriptive easement); Cunningham v. Dorsey, 3 W. Va. 293, 306 (1869) (same). 
165 The English courts struggled to define the legal basis for the doctrine. E.g., Blanchard v. 
Bridges (1835) 111 Eng. Rep. 753, 759–61; 4 Ad. & E. 176, 190–95. The acquisition of the easement 
for light and air through the ancient lights doctrine could not coherently be attributed to traditional 
prescription principles, since by continuously enjoying access to light and air over her neighbor’s land 
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only less than twenty years, the neighbor was free to construct any 
structure, regardless of its effects on the owner’s access to light and air. 
The ancient lights doctrine thus balanced neighbors’ competing interests in 
land use through a bright-line timing test. 
Because this test was formally adopted in England only after the 
colonies had broken away, American courts later in the nineteenth century 
would deny that it ever held sway here.166 But the historical record shows 
that when relevant disputes initially occurred in America in the 1830s and 
1840s, all courts considering the issue applied the ancient lights doctrine,167 
or at least assumed its authority.168 
Against this doctrinal background, the problem of spite structures—
more specifically, spite fences—first arose. Under the ancient lights 
doctrine, an owner was free to erect any structure, regardless of its effect on 
neighboring windows, for the first two decades following the windows’ 
opening. Was this also true if the structure erected during those early years 
was motived by spite? In 1836, a New York court affirmed that it was. The 
court declared in Mahan v. Brown169 that the owner was free to construct a 
spite fence blocking a neighbor’s views as long as it was built within the 
 
the owner was not engaged in an activity adverse to the rights of that neighbor, as is required for 
acquiring rights through adverse possession or prescriptive easement theories. The ancient lights rule’s 
theory was thus the lost grant—the easement’s long use was evidence of an earlier grant of said 
easement—which has since been lost or forgotten. See Bedle v. Beard (1607) 77 Eng. Rep. 1288, 1289; 
12 Co. Rep 4, 5 (“God forbid that ancient grants and acts should be drawn into question, although they 
cannot be shewn . . . .”); Note, Doctrine of Lost Grant, 16 HARV. L. REV 438, 438 (1903) (“At first, 
immemorial use was held to be necessary . . . . This unsatisfactory rule was later modified by the 
doctrine of lost grant.” (citation omitted)). A separate theory allowed for the recognition of a similar 
right to continued enjoyment of exposure to light and air even if that enjoyment did not date to ancient 
times. In the absence of prescription, a landowner’s right to light and air could still be protected if both 
neighboring lands—the land enjoying the light and air and the adjacent land whose owner was now 
blocking said light and air—were originally owned by the same person. Palmer v. Fletcher (1662) 
83 Eng. Rep. 329, 329; 1 Lev. 122, 122; WASHBURN, supra note 161, at 493–97. This doctrine is 
known today as easement implied by prior use. E.g., Granite Props. Ltd. P’ship v. Manns, 512 N.E.2d 
1230, 1236 (Ill. 1987). This doctrine of implied easements—which is no longer applied by American 
courts to easements for light and air—is grounded in the presumption that when the owner of both lots 
originally conveyed one of them, the intent was to convey or preserve an easement allowing one lot to 
continue enjoying rights over the other. 
166 E.g., Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528, 532–33 (1855). 
167 Manier v. Myers, 43 Ky. (4 B. Mon.) 514, 520 (1844); Story v. Odin, 12 Mass. (11 Tyng) 157, 
160 (1815); Robeson v. Pittenger, 2 N.J. Eq. 57, 64 (Ch. 1838) (explicitly rejecting the claim that 
conditions in the state differ from those in England so as to justify a refusal to apply the doctrine); 
McCready v. Thomson, 23 S.C.L. (Dud.) 131 (1838) (same); Shreve v. Voorhees, 3 N.J. Eq. 25, 32–33 
(Ch. 1834).  
168 Ray v. Lynes, 10 Ala. 63, 66 (1846); State v. Mayor & Aldermen of Mobile, 5 Port. 279, 302 
(Ala. 1837); Ingraham v. Hutchinson, 2 Conn. 584, 597–98 (1818); McDonogh v. Calloway, 7 Rob. 
442, 444 (La. 1844); Campbell v. Smith, 8 N.J.L. 140, 148 (1825); Cooper v. Smith, 9 Serg. & Rawle 
26, 33 (Pa. 1822); Lining v. Geddes, 6 S.C. Eq. (1 McCord Eq.) 304, 309 (1826). 
169 13 Wend. 261 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835). 
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ancient lights’ allowable period of time.170 Indeed, it was that doctrine’s 
presence that persuaded the court to refrain from banning the spiteful 
fence.171 Since the owner would lose his right to block the neighbor’s views 
if he failed to build within twenty years, fairness required that he enjoy full 
liberty until that period had passed.172 
This early move lends support to this Part’s argument. The New York 
court refused to assign legal significance to spite when there was no rule 
affording owners absolute freedom; that is, when no attenuating of a 
privilege rule was necessary. Through its timing test the ancient lights 
doctrine already balanced neighboring owners’ interests, and hence courts 
perceived no need to introduce a spite exception to perform that same 
function. The next stage in land use law’s development validates again that 
this—not the policing of mental states—has indeed been spite’s consistent 
function in American law. For after courts switched the governing rule in 
land use, turning a balancing rule into an owner’s absolute freedom rule, 
the prohibition on spiteful fences was reconsidered.173 
In New York, the switch of general rules in land use came briskly. 
Three years after the Mahan decision, New York courts rejected the ancient 
lights doctrine, freeing owners to erect structures at any time no matter the 
effect on neighbors’ longstanding exposure to light.174 The ancient lights 
doctrine’s reign in New York was particularly brief, but throughout the 
country, courts dismissed that English (and formerly American) doctrine in 
the 1850s and 1860s.175 The rejection was ascribed to the drastically 
differing physical conditions prevalent in England—the doctrine’s 
 
170 Id. at 263. 
171 H.H. Rumble, Limitations on the Use of Property by Its Owner, 5 VA. L. REV. 297, 307–08 
(1918). 
172 Mahan, 13 Wend. at 263. 
173 See Horan v. Byrnes, 54 A. 945, 947 (N.H. 1903) (explaining that Mahan’s denial of a spite 
prohibition became irrelevant once the view of land use law it stood upon was abandoned). 
174 Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309, 317–19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838). The court later stressed that the 
easement for light and air could similarly not be acquired through the doctrine of easement implied 
from prior use (i.e., even in cases where both lands were originally held by a common owner). Myers v. 
Gemmel, 10 Barb. 537, 545–46 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1851). 
175 See, e.g., Ward v. Neal, 37 Ala. 500, 501–02 (1861); Gerber v. Grabel, 16 Ill. 217, 223 (1854); 
Pierre v. Fernald, 26 Me. 436, 440–41, 443–44 (1847); Cherry v. Stein, 11 Md. 1, 21–23 (1858) 
(rejecting the ancient lights doctrine, but refusing to opine on the possibility that the easement for light 
and air could be acquired as an easement implied from prior use); Napier v. Bulwinkle, 39 S.C.L. 
(5 Rich.) 311, 316, 319–23 (1852) (same); King v. Miller, 8 N.J. Eq. 559, 559 (Ch. 1851); Klein v. 
Gehrung, 25 Tex. 232, 242 (Supp. 1860); Cunningham v. Dorsey, 3 W. Va. 293, 307 (1869). The first 
to appear hostile to the doctrine was the Massachusetts court. In dictum in a percolating water case, it 
declared: “[T]he proprietor . . . may consult his own convenience in his operations above or below the 
surface of his ground. He may obstruct the light and air above, and cut off the springs of water below 
the surface.” Greenleaf v. Francis, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 117, 123 (1836).  
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birthplace—and the New World.176 In a new land where cities were 
frenetically growing, the ancient lights doctrine carried worrisome 
antidevelopmental consequences.177 First, and most troubling, it 
aggressively limited construction. It prioritized pleasing views, which were 
now an indulgence, at the expense of new structures, which were a 
necessity.178 Second, it compelled empty lots’ owners to build on them 
immediately or risk losing the right to build, thereby hampering orderly 
development.179 For some courts, these reasons merely warranted limiting 
the doctrine’s reach in urban centers.180 But most courts forwent 
gradualism: they found the prodevelopment rationale so compelling that 
they renounced the ancient lights doctrine altogether, inaccurately denying 
ever recognizing it.181 The move formed part of the marked prodevelopment 
slant of American land law of the mid-nineteenth century. As prominent 
historians have noted in other contexts, to enable dynamic economic 
growth, the American law of the time broke with static property precepts 
that were characteristic of English law.182 
As the second half of the nineteenth century progressed, little doubt 
remained that the ancient lights doctrine was wholeheartedly repudiated. 
 
176 The technical rationale for the rejection was that, in its contemporary incarnation, the English 
doctrine, awarding the right after twenty years of continued enjoyment, was inspired by a statute of 
limitations not adopted in the colonies or states. Hence American courts argued that that doctrine did 
not form part of the common law applicable here. Cunningham v. Dorsey, 3 W. Va. 293, 306 (1869). 
Furthermore, and in the absence of statutory support, American courts stressed that the normal method 
for prescription’s operation was irrelevant to light and air as explained supra in note 165. A prescriptive 
right to continue an activity is gained after the landowner refrains from taking legal action to stop said 
activity for the statutory period of time. But the owner through whose land another receives light and air 
never had a legal right to stop the other from consuming the light and air. Cunningham, 3 W. Va. at 
306; King, 8 N.J. Eq. at 559. In most states the denial of the English statute of limitations thus led to the 
flat out rejection of the ancient lights doctrine. But for the Illinois court it was grounds for reverting to 
the original ancient lights doctrine. In Illinois, a right to continued access to light and air could only be 
acquired if the plaintiff had been enjoying it since time out of mind. Gerber v. Grabel, 16 Ill. 217, 221–
22 (1854).  
177 Parker, 19 Wend. at 318 (“[T]he modern English doctrine on the subject of lights . . . may do 
well enough in England . . . . But it cannot be applied in the growing cities and villages of this country, 
without working the most mischievous consequences.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); 
WASHBURN, supra note 161, at 497–98. The South Carolina court listed as factors distinguishing 
America from England and necessitating the abandonment of the doctrine not only the wider spaces and 
more rapid development found here, but also “the less jealous habits of our people.” Napier, 39 S.C.L. 
at 322–23. 
178 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1894). 
179 See Hoy v. Sterrett, 2 Watts 327, 331 (Pa. 1834). 
180 E.g., Fifty Assocs. v. Tudor, 72 Mass. (6 Gray), 255, 259–60 (1856); see also 3 JAMES KENT, 
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *448 (acknowledging the application of the ancient lights doctrine 
in the United States, but presuming that it does not apply to narrow urban lots). 
181 E.g., Haverstick v. Sipe, 33 Pa. 368, 371 (1859); Parker, 19 Wend. at 316–18. 
182 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 31–54 
(1977). 
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Unlike in England, in America an owner was free to build as she pleased.183 
The absolute privilege rule for land use was of the same cast as the 
contemporaneous absolute privilege rule for percolating waters. And as 
was the case with the Acton Rule, in due course, the absolute privilege rule 
for structures would strike courts and commentators as too strict, and 
exceptions—particularly, a spite exception—would emerge. 
The push to authorize courts to regulate owners’ land uses through 
balancing tests surfaced gradually as ideas about property evolved. A full 
account of the reinvention of property in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries extends beyond this Article’s scope, and I have 
elaborated on the topic elsewhere.184 A brief summary should suffice. As 
noted above, the ancient lights doctrine was unequivocally rejected during 
the middle decades of the nineteenth century—an era of fledgling 
economic development with a legal regime facilitating growth.185 But by 
century’s end, physical and economic conditions were changing drastically. 
The western frontier had closed,186 and the nation was rapidly urbanizing. 
In accordance, the impulse to facilitate development at all costs was easing. 
Furthermore, conflicts between owners, now living in much closer vicinity 
to each other than ever before, were intensifying. In the newly cramped 
settings of the built environment of the era, an owner needed a greater 
degree of protection against neighboring development that might threaten 
her well-being—even at the inevitable cost of a decrease in her own legal 
freedom to develop her land. 
This demand for protection translated into legal reforms. Water law, 
as seen earlier, was transformed;187 elsewhere, an aggressive nuisance 
jurisprudence developed to limit certain owner activities;188 new statutes 
barred other land uses;189 and tenement acts, launched by New York in 
 
183 See Sher v. Leiderman, 226 Cal. Rptr. 698, 702 (Ct. App. 1986) (explaining that a reason for the 
ancient lights’ rejection in the middle of the nineteenth century was that “a landowner’s rights to use his 
land were virtually unlimited; it was thought that he owned to the center of the earth and up to the 
heavens”). 
184 See Nadav Shoked, The Reinvention of Ownership: The Embrace of Residential Zoning and the 
Modern Populist Reading of Property, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 91 (2011). 
185 See supra notes 181–82 and accompanying text. 
186 On the significance of the disappearance of the “unsettled” West, see FREDERICK JACKSON 
TURNER, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1 (Penguin Books 2008) (1893). 
187 See supra Section II.A. 
188 E.g., McMorran v. Fitzgerald, 64 N.W. 569, 569–70 (Mich. 1895) (enjoining the operation of a 
machine and blacksmith shop in an area otherwise devoted to residences). See generally Robert G. 
Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance Law: 1850 to 1920, 59 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1101 (1986) (exploring the history of American nuisance law, which limits owners’ certain uses 
of land). 
189 See, e.g., In re Hang Kie, 10 P. 327, 328–29 (Cal. 1886) (approving statute limiting laundries); 
Cronin v. People, 82 N.Y. 318, 322–23 (1880) (approving statute limiting slaughter houses). 
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1867, set minimum standards for rental units.190 As part of this mounting 
wave of land use regulation, the prohibition on spite fences, rejected 
decades earlier in the Mahan decision discussed above, was reappraised. 
The tale of the case reevaluating the prohibition is emblematic of the 
evolving conditions and legal demands of the American-built environment 
of the late nineteenth century. In the already mentioned 1888 case of Burke 
v. Smith, the Michigan court was faced with a neighbors’ dispute from 
Kalamazoo.191 Originally a village, Kalamazoo graduated into cityhood less 
than five years before the dispute.192 The dispute arose when one owner, 
Burke, took advantage of the locale’s swift development by subdividing his 
lot into rental units.193 Unpleased with the project, a neighbor named Smith 
erected a fence blocking light from reaching one of the units.194 The court 
enjoined this fence, holding that the rule affording Smith the right to build 
as he pleases—i.e., the denial of the ancient lights doctrine—must admit an 
exception for structures motivated by spite, such as Smith’s fence.195 
The treatment of that Kalamazoo spite fence set the tone for fences 
elsewhere. In the succeeding years, many courts followed Burke,196 and 
concurrently, the 1880s and the ensuing decades witnessed a spate of 
statutes specifically barring spite fences.197 By and large, the earlier New 
York decision of Mahan was no longer the law of the land.198 Like the 
digging of spite wells discussed earlier, the erection of spite fences ceased 
to count among an owner’s prerogatives. 
On its face, the prohibition on spite fences—whether originating in 
judicial or legislative act—trafficked in mental states. As explained in 
Burke, an owner was proscribed from acting for “a wicked purpose . . . to 
gratify his spite and malice towards his neighbor.”199 Yet almost 
immediately after spite’s introduction, the test changed. Two years after 
Burke, the Michigan court transformed the question, “Was the fence 
 
190 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING: A CENTURY OF FRUSTRATION 
25–39 (1968). 
191 37 N.W. 838, 838 (Mich. 1888). 
192 An Act to Re-incorporate the Village of Kalamazoo, and to Repeal All Inconsistent Acts and 
Parts of Acts, No. 337, 1883 Mich. Pub. Acts 667 (incorporating the village of Kalamazoo as the city of 
Kalamazoo).  
193 Burke, 37 N.W. at 838. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 839–40.  
196 POWELL, supra note 34, at § 62.05, at 62-45 n.4 (explaining that the decision represented a 
turning point for many other states). 
197 See infra notes 210–15. 
198 In New York, a court found the “old” Mahan precedent irrelevant since the legislature adopted a 
spite fence statute. Saperstein v. Berman, 195 N.Y.S. 1, 2 (Sup. Ct. 1922). 
199 37 N.W. at 842. 
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builder’s purpose wicked?” into the question, “Does the fence serve a 
‘useful or needful purpose?’”200 
When determining whether a fence was spiteful, courts in Michigan 
and the other states asked whether it served a useful purpose. The precise 
role assigned to this question was not always clear. The question could 
sometimes be read as the evidentiary tool through which spite’s presence 
was discerned.201 More often, it was posed as the substantive test for spite: a 
spiteful fence was a fence lacking a useful purpose.202 Either way, this, and 
not the question respecting the builder’s actual mental state, was the 
inquiry courts preferred to contemplate when debating the existence of 
spite. Such invocation of a usefulness standard inexorably shifted spite 
law’s focus away from its alleged subjective interest.203 
One court appears to have sensed this shift and could not square it 
with the reasoning leading to the spite prohibition.204 The Alabama court 
thus insisted that a plaintiff actually prove the defendant’s malicious intent 
to injure him.205 The plaintiff in that case provided evidence that the fence 
was useless, but the court would not equate uselessness with malice, or 
infer the latter from the former.206 Yet the Alabama court was an outlier. 
Elsewhere, courts could readily announce: “Even though it should be held 
that defendants did not intend to injure plaintiff’s business, yet, since their 
acts brought about such a result, with no profits or benefits to themselves, 
the legal effect of their action is the same as if they had purposely intended 
the result.”207 Accordingly, it became clear that a spiteful fence could be 
found in actual spite’s absence,208 and that a fence motivated by actual spite 
could be deemed nonspiteful.209 
 
200 Flaherty v. Moran, 45 N.W. 381, 381 (Mich. 1890). 
201 E.g., Hibbard v. Halliday, 158 P. 1158, 1159 (Okla. 1916). 
202 E.g., Parker v. Harvey, 164 So. 507, 512 (La. Ct. App. 1935); Metz v. Tierney, 83 P. 788, 788 
(N.M. 1906); Bush v. Mockett, 145 N.W. 1001, 1002 (Neb. 1914); Barger v. Barringer, 66 S.E. 439, 
442 (N.C. 1909); Racich v. Mastrovich, 273 N.W. 660, 663 (S.D. 1937). 
203 Perhaps for this reason, one early twentieth-century writer actually referred to the early spite 
fence cases as “apply[ing] the doctrine of reasonable use in cases involving unnecessary obstruction of 
light and air.” Rumble, supra note 171, at 308. The author concludes that the cases should be read as 
instituting a principle that “[a] use which is inspired by malice and which is injurious to others than the 
owner, in order to be lawful, must be reasonable.” Id. at 314 (emphasis removed). 
204 Norton v. Randolph, 58 So. 283, 285 (Ala. 1912). 
205 Id. at 286. 
206 Id. 
207 Parker, 164 So. at 512. 
208 E.g., id. 
209 Stroup v. Rauschelbach, 261 S.W. 346, 347 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924); Green v. Schick, 153 P.2d 
821, 822 (Okla. 1944). 
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Courts thus incorporated a usefulness requirement into precedents 
prohibiting spite fences, lessening their subjective slant. Where the 
prohibition was instituted through statute, there was much less need for 
such judicial moves as, in the first place, most legislatures set objective 
standards for their statutes’ application. Some statutes did not even require 
spite when enjoining “spite” fences. The 1885 California law required an 
adjoining landowner’s consent for the construction of any fence exceeding 
ten feet in height.210 New York’s 1922 law declared all such fences 
blocking a neighbor’s light and air nuisances.211 Other statutes that did 
require spite supplemented the spite requirement with other, objective 
prerequisites. The fence not only had to be spitefully motivated, but it also 
had to exceed a certain height (generally, six feet), and most prominently, 
be “unnecessary.”212 In other words, under the statutes, not all spite fences 
were spite fences for legal purposes: a low fence could never be actionable, 
and a tall fence could not be barred if it were in some way necessary. 
Courts regarded the unnecessariness requirement as vital. When the 
Massachusetts spite fence statute’s constitutionality was challenged, Justice 
Holmes implied that it would not have been upheld had its ambit not been 
qualified through the unnecessariness requirement: “If the height above six 
feet is really necessary for any reason, there [must be] no liability, 
whatever the motives of the owner in erecting it.”213 Likewise, in 
Washington and Connecticut, two of only three states whose statutes 
merely required malicious intent to render a fence actionable,214 courts 
 
210 Act of Mar. 9, 1885, ch. 39, 1885 Cal. Stat. 45. 
211 Act of Mar. 30, 1922, ch. 374, 1922 N.Y. Laws 795 (applicable to fences over ten feet). 
212 Act of May 28, 1913, ch. 197, 1913 Cal. Stat. 342 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 841.4 (Deering 2014)) (ten feet) (adopting a second spite fence law after the scope of the first one was 
drastically narrowed by the court in Granite & Marble v. Knickerbocker, 37 P. 192 (Cal. 1894)); Act of 
Mar. 7, 1893, ch. 188, 1893 Me. Laws 205 (codified as amended at ME STAT. tit. 17, § 2801 (2014)) 
(eight feet; amended to six feet by Act of Mar. 26, 1903, ch. 153, 1903 Me. Laws 119); Act of June 2, 
1887, ch. 348, 1887 Mass. Acts 971 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 49, § 21 (2014)) 
(six feet); Act of Oct. 25, 1887, ch. 91, 1887 N.H. Laws 469 (codified as amended at N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 476:1 (2014)) (five feet); Act of June 22, 1917, ch. 213, 1917 Pa. Laws 621 (codified as 
amended at 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 15171 (West 2014)) (four feet); Act of May 4, 1909, ch. 
416, 1909 R.I. Pub. Laws 148 (codified as amended at 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-10-20 (2014)) (six feet); 
Act of Nov. 19, 1886, ch. 84, 1887 Vt. Acts & Resolves 59 (codified as amended at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
24, § 3817 (2014)) (six feet; amended to no height restriction by Act of Dec. 11, 1912, ch. 154, 1913 
Vt. Acts & Resolves 185); Act of Apr. 20, 1903, ch. 81, Wis. Sess. Laws 121 (repealed by Act of Apr. 
24, 1974, ch. 189, § 11, 1974 Wis. Sess. Laws 595) (six feet) (overruling Metzger v. Hochrein, 83 N.W. 
308 (Wis. 1900), where the court refused to adopt the spite fence doctrine). 
213 Rideout v. Knox, 19 N.E. 390, 392 (Mass. 1889). 
214 The third state was Minnesota. See Act of Apr. 24, 1907, ch. 387, 1907 Minn. Laws 545 
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 561.02 (2014)). However, it was not until 2009 that a nuisance 
case was decided in reference to the statute. See Gelao v. Coss, No. A08-1725, 2009 WL 2745833, at 
*7–8 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2009). 
SHOKED (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/2016 12:24 PM 
110:357 (2016) Two Hundred Years of Spite 
393 
added the requirement that the fence be unnecessary.215 The Connecticut 
court explained that although the statute solely required malicious intent, 
“intention relates to the thing done and its purpose and effect, and does not 
depend on the existence or nonexistence of personal spite or ill will.”216 
Accordingly, the court concluded that the degree to which the defendant in 
the case at bar shared his spouse’s enmity towards the plaintiff was of 
limited importance to a spite finding.217 The determinative question was 
whether the fence he had built was of any use.218 
In a process mirroring the one Section II.A detected in water law, the 
adjective spiteful in land use law was reimagined as meaning useless or 
unnecessary. A term relating to subjective personal intent was replaced 
with one reflecting objective social worth.219 This development did not 
render the doctrine less innovative for its time; if anything, it made spite 
more revolutionary. Spite doctrine measured a structure’s social value 
before condoning an owner’s decision to build. It thence turned into a tool 
for regulating land uses—into one of the first legal instruments 
empowering public decisionmakers to design the physical environment in a 
socially beneficial manner. The equation of spitefulness with uselessness 
did so almost explicitly: the criterion for spite was that a fence generate 
harm to one piece of land without generating a benefit to another.220 As 
courts stated, this was at heart a reasonableness, or proportionality, test.221 
One court clarified that the “evil” spite fence laws were intended to remedy 
was not 
the bickerings, spite, and hatred arising from neighborhood quarrels. It is 
difficult for any legislation to remedy such evil. Plainly, the real evil consists 
in the occasional subjection of a landowner to the impairment of the value of 
his land by the erection of a structure which substantially serves . . . no 
purpose . . . .222 
Similarly, for Justice Holmes the spite fence prohibition was a 
constitutional exercise of the police power since “it simply restrains a 
noxious use of the owner’s premises”223 and “limit[s] the use of property in 
 
215 Whitlock v. Uhle, 53 A. 891, 892 (Conn. 1903); Karasek v. Peier, 61 P. 33, 36 (Wash. 1900).  
216 Whitlock, 53 A. at 892. 
217 Id. at 893. 
218 Id. at 892. 
219 The modern doctrine of spite was said to be “based on the rule of reason.” Rumble, supra note 
171, at 315. 
220 Whitlock, 53 A. at 892. 
221 E.g., Bush v. Mockett, 145 N.W. 1001, 1002 (Neb. 1914); Horan v. Byrnes, 54 A. 945, 948–49 
(N.H. 1903); Karasek v. Peier, 61 P. 33, 36 (Wash. 1900). 
222 Whitlock, 53 A. at 892. 
223 Rideout v. Knox, 19 N.E. 390, 392 (Mass. 1889). 
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ways which greatly diminish its value.”224 Spite law did not strive to 
proliferate common decency values; it endeavored to stimulate property 
values. 
As in water law, the prohibition on spite in land use burgeoned from a 
realization that unbridled owner freedom may no longer be easily justified, 
and thus the value of the use an owner chooses for her property should 
sometimes be assessed. Spite was therefore a step away from the existing 
regime monopolizing power in the owner. But as was the case in water law, 
it was merely a first step—a timid and cautious one. Needs and ideas had 
changed, but not far enough to fully undermine the prodevelopment 
policies that engendered the rejection of the ancient lights doctrine. The 
prohibition on spite fences did not posit too great of a threat to these 
values.225 It singled out the construction of fences—and only fences—for 
special treatment. This feature encapsulated the prohibition’s special 
appeal. For jurists commencing to register the risk of unchecked 
development but still queasy about full-blown land use regulation, a 
prohibition applicable to fences alone was a confined, and therefore 
attractive, rule.226 It was a convenient way station along a still tentative 
course away from the absolute owner freedom regime. 
Especially in retrospect, this guarded prohibition materializes as 
harbinger of broader rules yet to come for thorough collective design of the 
built environment. For example, statutes regulating spite fences towering 
beyond a fixed height served as precursors to modern regulations capping 
all structures’ heights. Or consider the Pennsylvania spite fence statute, 
which held sway only in “suburban” areas.227 Its mode of operation was that 
of future zoning laws, which would divide space into districts and enforce 
different regulations in each. 
As in water law, the exception from the owner privilege rule carved 
out for spitefully motivated acts in land use announced the upcoming 
general shift from a regime premised on the owner’s right to act as she 
 
224 Id. at 393. 
225 For some courts this was cause enough to decline the prohibition on spite fences. Since an 
owner would be allowed to construct any other structure causing the same effects, there was no reason 
to block him from constructing a fence. See, e.g., Giller v. West, 69 N.E. 548, 549 (Ind. 1904); Saddler 
v. Alexander, 56 S.W. 518, 519 (Ky. 1900); Bordeaux v. Greene, 56 P. 218, 219 (Mont. 1899); Letts v. 
Kessler, 42 N.E. 765, 766 (Ohio 1896). 
226 Thus, for example, some courts stubbornly questioned local governments’ power to refuse 
building permits, State v. Tenant, 14 S.E. 387, 388 (N.C. 1892), to prohibit some businesses, City of St. 
Louis v. Dorr, 46 S.W. 976, 977 (Mo. 1897) (en banc), or to zone, Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 
513, 514–15 (Tex. 1921). 
227 Act of June 22, 1917, ch. 213, 1917 Pa. Laws 621 (codified as amended at 53 PA. STAT. AND 
CONS. STAT. § 15171 (West 2014)). 
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pleases to one steeped in public regulation.228 The objective balancing 
approach that spite applied to fences would shortly expand through varied 
legal means to cover all land use decisions. As seen, courts and legislatures 
rediscovered the spite prohibition in the late 1880s. Almost immediately 
thereafter, in the final decade of the nineteenth century, legislatures began 
adopting general height regulations (laws restricting the height of all 
buildings in a city or part thereof).229 In the next decade, opening the 
twentieth century, they enacted rules respecting buildings’ bulk (laws 
establishing setbacks, minimum lot sizes, and lot coverage limitations).230 
In the century’s second decade, zoning laws (laws limiting the size, 
location, and use of buildings in a city or part thereof) were introduced and 
rapidly spread.231 Within a very short span of time, the meaning of property 
in American law had shifted. Property law was no longer first and foremost 
dedicated to the owner’s freedom to set the agenda for her land’s use. 
Rather, it was committed to orderly growth and to protecting owners from 
rampant development.232 Owners were now subject to onerous restrictions 
and conditions aimed at safeguarding public benefits whenever they sought 
to construct a building on their lands. The logic animating the spite 
exception was generalized. Universal laws now achieved directly the goals 
of social balancing and regulated development that the spite exception 
pursued indirectly. 
Inevitably, though, the need for a spite exception to the rule 
privileging owners’ right to build disappeared alongside that privilege 
 
228 See ROBERT ELLICKSON & VICKI BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 549 
(4th ed. 2013) (noting “spite fence doctrine” was one of the “earliest [principles] to evolve” in 
“American nuisance law”). 
229 Massachusetts enacted height regulations for Boston in 1891–1892. The restriction was upheld 
in Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909). 
230 E.g., Wulfsohn v. Burden, 150 N.E. 120, 121, 125 (N.Y. 1925) (upholding the constitutionality 
of Act of 1909, ch. 26, 1909 N.Y. Laws 15). 
231 The first comprehensive zoning ordinance was adopted by New York City in 1916. It divided 
the city into use districts, area districts, and height districts. The state court approved the ordinance in 
Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams, 128 N.E. 209 (N.Y. 1920). A few years before, in 1909, Los Angeles 
approved an ordinance establishing “industrial districts” and declaring the remainder of the city to be a 
“residence district,” where certain occupations, including laundries, were prohibited. The court 
approved in Ex parte Quong Wo, 118 P. 714 (Cal. 1911). In 1910, Los Angeles further excluded brick 
factories from some of the industrial districts. The Supreme Court upheld the move. Hadacheck v. 
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 404, 413 (1915). By 1926, all but five of the states had adopted zoning 
enabling acts, and 420 municipalities had zoning ordinances. Brief for National Conference on City 
Planning et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 
365 (1926) (No. 31), reprinted in ALFRED BETTMAN, CITY AND REGIONAL PLANNING PAPERS 157–93 
(Arthur C. Comey ed., 1946). 
232 See Shoked, supra note 184, at 142–45. 
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rule.233 The same occurred, as should be recalled, in water law. The law 
moved away from using the owner’s freedom as the baseline and towards 
defaulting to objective regulation of her activity’s social costs and benefits. 
Once that transformation was complete, the spite prohibition, always 
concerned with that same form of objective regulation rather than with 
motive tests, ceased to develop and withered away.234 Spite fence statutes 
remained on the books, and precedents invalidating spite fences stood 
undisturbed, but courts were unwilling to broaden them beyond their 
existing, and highly qualified, scope.235 
Most prominently, when solicited to apply spite prohibitions—
particularly, though not only, those found in statutes236—courts from the 
second quarter of the twentieth century onwards asserted that the only 
structures that could ever be enjoined were fences, the subject matter of the 
old cases and statutes.237 Hence, often spite law cases came to hinge on one 
question: what structures counted as fences? The litigated issue was 
whether the contested structure was close enough to the property line to 
constitute a fence,238 and whether it was in the “character” of a fence. Thus, 
dilapidated houses could not be enjoined as spiteful,239 but a sign could.240 A 
 
233 Cf. Kelly, supra note 39, at 1661 (noting that once zoning laws separated residential from 
commercial and industrial parcels, litigation over nuisances created to force the disturbed party to buy 
out the disturbing parties subsided). 
234 Sometimes the power to prohibit spite fences was inserted into a general authorization to 
regulate the height of fences. E.g., Act of Mar. 12, 1909, ch. 31, ch. 6, § 23, 1909 Tex. Loc. & Spec. 
Laws 227, 272 (incorporating in the special charter granted to the city of Fort Worth the “power to 
regulate the height and character of fences on private property . . . , and to prohibit the erection or 
maintenance of ‘spite fences’”). 
235 E.g., Cohen v. Perrino, 50 A.2d 348, 350–51 (Pa. 1947). 
236 Courts used spite fence statutes to actually limit the reach of the doctrine in other ways as well. 
For example, one court refused to apply the judicial doctrine to instances excluded from the state’s 
fence law, which only applied to fences of six feet or more. Musumeci v. Leonardo, 75 A.2d 175, 177–
78 (R.I. 1950). 
237 Even in the three states whose spite fence laws explicitly state their application to all structures, 
courts have been reluctant to deal with non-fences. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-480, 52-570 (2014); 
MINN. STAT. § 561.02 (2014); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.40.030 (2014). Only in one case has a court 
exhibited a willingness to do so. See Piotrowski v. Esparo, No. CV084008715, 2009 WL 962694, at 
*1–3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 2009) (finding the moving of a hangar, which was useful in itself, to 
abut neighboring land was spiteful). In all other cases the claim has been adamantly rejected. E.g., 
Gundstrom v. Zweifel, No. A08-2259, 2009 WL 2747249, at *2–3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2009) 
(refusing to apply the statute to an unsightly mound of dirt). In Washington, the court held early on that 
a literal interpretation of the statute, empowering courts to block all structures and not just fences, 
would be unconstitutional. Karasek v. Peier, 61 P. 33, 36 (Wash. 1900). Hence the court later held that a 
garage could not be covered. Jones v. Williams, 106 P. 166, 168–69 (Wash. 1910). 
238 See, e.g., Deraismes v. Ferguson, No. WC 2007-0040, 2011 WL 997145, at *11–12 (R.I. Super. 
Ct. Mar. 18, 2011). 
239 White v. Bernhart, 241 P. 367, 369 (Idaho 1925). 
240 Sundowner, Inc. v. King, 509 P.2d 785, 787 (Idaho 1973). 
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row of trees241 or a pile of logs242 could be enjoined, but an elevator 
enclosure could not.243 
In addition, after having determined that the disputed structure was 
indeed a fence, twentieth-century courts in spite cases insisted, even more 
forcefully than their predecessors, that the criterion for an actionable fence 
was whether its harms exceeded its benefits; malice-based tests, they 
explained, were outdated.244 They became outdated when property law 
explicitly espoused the public policy oriented limits to owners’ freedom the 
doctrine had introduced under the guise of those malice-based tests. At that 
point, spite doctrine in its entirety could be deemed outdated, and 
accordingly courts grew reluctant to resort to it at all. Any social ill 
previously addressed by spite fence jurisprudence was currently addressed 
by zoning laws. Courts were disinclined to employ the spite prohibition to 
supplement these laws, even when the owner inarguably acted spitefully. In 
the Fontainebleau case, mentioned in the Introduction, Novack’s malicious 
intent in blocking the Eden Roc’s pool owned by his former partner was 
indubitable. The Florida court still refused to enjoin the spite wall. As it 
explained, if Eden Roc were correct in arguing that there were good policy 
reasons to halt the wall, it should have persuaded the Miami Beach zoning 
authorities to act.245 In Miami Beach, as elsewhere in the twentieth century, 
local authorities were constantly balancing competing land uses’ utilities. 
There was therefore no need—indeed, there was no justification—for 
courts to resort to a spite doctrine that, always caring very little about 
actual spite, had allowed such objective balancing when no other authority 
was engaged in planning. 
In these ways, the spite prohibition in land use was sidelined during 
the twentieth century. The authors wedded to the notion of abuse of right, 
whose work was reviewed in Part I, ignore this current reality and overstate 
spite’s importance in twentieth- and twenty-first-century land use law. At 
the same time, paradoxically, they understate spite’s importance to the 
emergence of twentieth- and twenty-first-century land use law. The reason 
spite occupies a marginal position in the law today—applied, if at all, to 
fences alone—is that its true rationale has permeated all aspects of land use 
law. Spite was introduced when the law was premised on an owner’s 
 
241 Dowdell v. Bloomquist, 847 A.2d 827, 830 (R.I. 2004). 
242 Dunbar v. O’Brien, 220 N.W. 278, 279 (Neb. 1928). 
243 Blair v. 305–313 E. 47th St. Assocs., 474 N.Y.S.2d 353, 356 (Sup. Ct. 1983). 
244 See, e.g., Webb v. Lambley, 148 N.W.2d 835, 837–38 (Neb. 1967); Hay v. Stevens, 530 P.2d 
37, 40 (Or. 1975); Schork v. Epperson, 287 P.2d 467, 470–71 (Wyo. 1955). 
245 Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 360 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1959). 
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freedom to build. The spite prohibition moderated that freedom through a 
requirement that the structure built be socially useful. The prohibition did 
not serve to punish ill-meaning owners; it served to enable land use 
regulation in an era that knew little such regulation. As the concept of 
property evolved, and as spite doctrine’s idea—the idea that social 
regulation is imperative—overthrew land use law’s devotion to owners’ 
freedom, spite doctrine itself became an afterthought. A doctrine that had 
heralded property’s redefinition in American law became, due to its 
success, a body of law dedicated to divining what is a fence. 
C. Spite in Support Rights and in Restraints on Alienation 
In water and land use law, a legal category of spite, albeit hardly ever 
correlating to the lay category of spite, has played a major role in the law’s 
development. In two other property law subfields—support rights and 
restraints on alienation—spite technically formed at times part of the law, 
but it did not actually play any role in its operation. Lawmakers’ eschewal 
from relying on the formally available spite category in these subfields 
unsettles the first element of the reigning reading of spite’s function, 
reviewed in Part I, which holds that spite is a meaningful, broad concept 
restraining owners. Furthermore, the circumstances surrounding the judicial 
inaction on spite in these subfields aid in upending that reading’s other 
element: that spite regulates mental states. The legal nonintervention in 
these subfields reinforces this Part’s thesis that the spite prohibition was 
used to introduce objective, not subjective, balancing into property law 
when the law lacked such balancing. The law governing support and 
restraints on alienation already, in and of itself, limited the owner’s 
freedom of action through objective balancing—and hence in neither did 
courts experience an impulse to avail themselves of the spite prohibition. 
The first-ever judicial declaration that an act spitefully motivated is 
actionable was made not in a water or land use dispute, but in a conflict 
over support for soil. Yet not in that case, nor in any other support conflict 
that followed, was that prohibition enforced. In their factual underpinnings, 
such quarrels over support are reminiscent of those revolving around 
underground water. As with conflicts over percolating waters, conflicts 
over soil support arise when one owner digs on her land. In debates over 
percolating waters, reviewed in Section II.A, the neighbor’s attendant harm 
is the resultant lost ability to withdraw water from her land; in debates over 
support rights, the harm is the resultant loss of support for her land and its 
subsidence or even collapse. Unlike its indifference, expressed through the 
Acton Rule, towards neighbors’ complaints over lost percolating waters, 
however, the common law never granted the owner the freedom to 
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excavate with disregard to such harms. Rather, it has historically held that a 
neighbor has a “right to have the soil in its natural condition supported by 
the soil of adjoining land.”246 Thus all owners are subject to a strict liability 
duty not to remove support for their neighbors’ lands.247 The rule clearly 
limits an owner’s freedom of excavation, but its phrasing strictly delineates 
that limit. The owner will be liable, always, if she excavates and removes 
support for her neighbor’s land in its natural conditions.248 Ergo the rule 
does not apply if the owner removes support for her neighbor’s 
structures.249 
Still, as the New York court clarified early on, in 1819, the fact that 
the owner is not automatically liable for an excavation removing support 
for her neighbors’ structures does not intimate that she can never be found 
liable. She will be liable if she acted maliciously.250 The ruling thus 
included the first statement in American law that “[i]n the exercise of a 
lawful right, a party may become liable to an action, where it appears that 
the act was done maliciously.”251 Dramatic as the statement might have 
been, however, the ruling also assured that it would carry little effect: the 
court added that a defendant charged for removal of support for structures 
could also be found liable in malice’s absence—if she acted negligently.252 
The move to equate spite with unreasonableness, accomplished only 
gradually and implicitly in water law and land use law, was completed 
immediately and explicitly upon the introduction of the spite prohibition 
into support law. Courts experienced none of the circumspection evident in 
those other subfields because, unlike in water law and land use law, the rule 
governing support rights never awarded owners absolute freedom; from the 
outset, the owner’s right was limited as she could not remove support for 
neighboring land in its natural conditions. Some degree of interest 
balancing between neighbors was always present, and never questioned, in 
support law. Forthrightly expanding such balancing was therefore 
uncontroversial and could proceed directly rather than obliquely under the 
pretense of spite analysis. 
Consequently the prohibition on malicious motives, formally 
recognized in New York and elsewhere, has not played any role in support 
 
246 8 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, § 69.01 (David A. Thomas ed., 2d Thomas ed. 2015), 
LexisNexis TORPTE.  
247 Tunstall v. Christian, 80 Va. 1, 3 (1885). 
248 See Wyatt v. Harrison (1832) 110 Eng. Rep. 320, 322; 3 B. & Ad. 870, 874–76. 
249 See Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass. 220, 229 (1815). 
250 Panton v. Holland, 17 Johns. 92, 98 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819). 
251 Id. 
252 Id. at 99. 
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law. Courts have continued throughout the centuries to list “improper 
motive” as a circumstance potentially generating liability for removal of 
lateral support for structures.253 However, since they have also 
acknowledged negligence as basis for liability,254 these statements have 
amounted to little; no case has ever turned on improper motive, and, 
moreover, no court has ever investigated an excavator’s motive.255 
The spite prohibition met a similar insipid fate in the property law 
subfield of restraints on alienation. This body of law limits an owner’s 
ability to restrict future transfers of her land. Through a restraint on 
alienation, an owner attempts, by terms of her land’s conveyance, to 
eliminate successors’ power to transfer the property, or to “lessen the 
likelihood of their exercise of this power by stating adverse consequences 
of an attempt later t[o] transfer.”256 Due to the social interest in land’s 
alienability, English common law held such restraints void as “repugnant” 
to the fee.257 In the nineteenth century, American courts adopted this rule.258 
Yet it was soon qualified to apply only to unreasonable restraints. 
The decisive factor in determining a restraint’s reasonableness was its 
extent: whether it was absolute or partial (i.e., qualified in its duration, in 
the class of people to whom it bars transfers, etc.).259 Still, courts260 and the 
original Restatement261 also listed as unreasonable restraints that were 
“capricious” or “imposed for spite or malice.” An example of a restraint 
struck down as imposed for spite is found in the Arkansas case Casey v. 
 
253 E.g., Winn v. Abeles, 10 P. 443, 447 (Kan. 1886); McGuire v. Grant, 25 N.J.L. 356, 361 (Sup. 
Ct. 1856); Schultz v. Byers, 22 A. 514, 514–15 (N.J. 1891). 
254 E.g., Conboy v. Dickinson, 28 P. 809, 810 (Cal. 1891); City of Quincy v. Jones, 76 Ill. 231, 241 
(1875). Courts have stressed that the negligence standard applied in these cases may not be as taxing as 
in other cases. E.g., Charless v. Rankin, 22 Mo. 566, 574 (1856). 
255 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 819 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (stating that strong 
dicta supports the proposition that an excavation is itself unreasonable when made for the sole purpose 
of harming another’s premises); F.E.M., Annotation, Liability of One Excavating on His Own Premises 
for Resulting Injury to Adjoining Building, 50 A.L.R. 486, § 1(c), at 498 (1927) (“Though there appears 
to be no case wherein liability has been actually imposed on this ground, obiter statements to that effect 
may be found in a number of decisions.”). 
256 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS pt. 2, intro. note, at 143 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1983). 
257 See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION §§ 18–19, at 9–10 (2d ed., Boston, 
Bos. Book Co. 1895) (1893). 
258 E.g., Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78, 107 (1874); De Peyster v. Michael, 6 N.Y. 467, 
505 (1852). For an overview, see generally Richard E. Manning, The Development of Restraints on 
Alienation Since Gray, 48 HARV. L. REV. 373 (1935). 
259 See, e.g., Lawson v. Lightfoot, 84 S.W. 739, 740 (Ky. 1905); Munroe v. Hall, 1 S.E. 651, 653 
(N.C. 1887). 
260 See, e.g., Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 729 (1915); Lawson v. Redmoor 
Corp., 679 P.2d 972, 974 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). 
261 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 406 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1944). 
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Casey,262 where a testator devised land to his son subject to the condition 
that the son would lose the land if he ever attempted to transfer it to his 
daughter (the testator’s granddaughter) or allowed her to stay therein for 
more than one week per year.263 Other than in that sole case, however, no 
court passing judgment on the reasonableness of a restraint on alienation 
ever addressed the caprice and spite factors listed in the early version of the 
Restatement, and accordingly they disappear from subsequent 
Restatements. 
In light of this Part’s findings with respect to other property subfields, 
the paucity of cases dealing with spiteful restraints on alienation is readily 
explicable. As shown, spite was used to introduce objective interest 
balancing where such balancing was missing. The unreasonable restraints 
on alienation doctrine always invited courts to engage in an objective 
balancing of the competing interests of the owner drafting the restraint and 
those affected. There was no need for a spite exception to stealthily open 
the door for such balancing. Reasonableness was incorporated into the 
doctrine; indeed, into its name. Spite was important in property subfields 
where an owner enjoyed uninhibited freedom of action—in water law and 
land use law where the Acton Rule and the rejection of the ancient lights 
doctrine, respectively, isolated owners from regulation. The appeal to spite 
empowered courts to engage in regulation. Once the absolute rule was 
replaced with a balancing rule—reasonable use in water law, zoning in land 
use—the spite exception faded away. In subfields where the rule always 
placed a balancing-based limit to owners’ freedom—in support law and 
restraints on alienation—spite was a feeble element of the law throughout. 
D. Summary: The Nature of American Spite 
Invariably, whether playing a meaningful role in a subfield—by 
announcing the demise of absolute freedom rules—or amounting to a mere 
trifle in a subfield—where such rules never ascended—at no time did spite 
target deplorable mental states. Spite tells us much about ideas of property 
in American law, but the lesson it teaches is disconnected from that read by 
current commentators. The latter contend, as seen in Part I, that spite is a 
general restraint on ownership instituting a mental-state-based test for 
judging owners’ acts. Yet the two centuries of American spite, explored in 
this Part, illustrate that mental states never set property rights’ 
boundaries—definitely not in general, but also not in the specific property 
law subfields where a spite prohibition was recognized at some point. 
 
262 700 S.W.2d 46 (Ark. 1985). 
263 Id. at 47, 49. 
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Legal spite in America has had nothing to do with spite; rather, for 
centuries it incarnated the irresistible yearning for an assessment of 
property uses’ social costs and benefits. 
III. WHAT IS WRONG WITH SPITE? SPITE’S NORMATIVE STANDING 
Why did courts consistently refrain from employing the spite 
prohibition as a mental state test? Was it a justified normative decision or a 
mistake? Part II debunked the scholarly consensus that spite is a property 
doctrine blocking owners from acting in pursuit of certain desires. It 
thereby explained why American law does not investigate or censure Mr. 
Markovitz’s motive in erecting the middle-finger statue that launched this 
Article. Still, the claim promoted by the many commentators whose work 
was reviewed in Part I is not solely descriptive. They insist that property 
law bans spite and that it should ban spite. This final Part will argue that 
this normative component of the conventional story of spite is as flawed as 
its descriptive component: property law not only refrains from prohibiting 
spite, it also cannot, and should not, prohibit spite. The law, that is, must 
remain indifferent to Mr. Markovitz’s pettiness. 
The assertion thus to be made is that spite’s evolution in water law and 
land use law, whereby lawmakers transformed the subjective exploration of 
owners’ motives into objective analysis of their acts’ utility, is inevitable 
and desirable. Property law must be concerned not with intentions, but with 
effects. The alternative is logically incoherent and normatively 
incompatible with property law’s goals. 
The normative argument of commentators embracing that 
alternative—i.e., the subjective spite prohibition—is straightforward: the 
law ought not empower an owner to act solely to harm another. This 
contention’s starting point is the conviction that sometimes an act’s legality 
must hinge on the actor’s motivation. As Mitchell Berman succinctly put it: 
“Reasons matter.”264 The explanations anti-spite writers provide for why 
reasons matter, and more specifically, for why spiteful reasons must be 
disqualified, are diverse. Some argue that since the purpose for which 
society recognized private ownership is effective use of land, an owner’s 
decision to do something with land must be guided by an informed 
judgment respecting the land’s desirable use.265 Others contend that since, 
in a social system, harms inflicted on others must be morally justified, an 
owner knowingly inflicting harm must sincerely believe that there are good 
 
264 Mitchell Berman, Abuse of Property Right Without Political Foundations, 124 YALE L.J. 
FORUM 42, 52 (2014). 
265 E.g., Katz, supra note 15, at 1450. 
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moral reasons backing him.266 Still others employ a Kantian argument: an 
owner should not set out to exploit another’s psychic vulnerability, thereby 
appropriating that person’s existence, making himself better off than he 
would have been had that other person not existed.267 Finally, some rely on 
economic analysis to conclude that a spiteful decision is unlikely to 
augment overall welfare.268 True, the spiteful owner derives enjoyment 
from his victim’s suffering,269 but such subjective enjoyment is hard to 
assess. Hence it is impossible to determine whether it outweighs the loss of 
enjoyment the victim experiences.270 Even if it does, the costs of 
precautions all owners will undertake if spiteful acts are legalized, added to 
the costs of the ensuing retaliatory cascade, should prove higher than 
whatever enjoyment an owner derives from witnessing his neighbor’s 
plight.271 
On account of these diverse reasons, commentators believe that an 
action motivated by spite alone should be banned. This is an intuitively 
attractive rule. It sets, based on moral grounds, a clear line demarking the 
permissible in neighbors’ interactions. Appealing as it may be in the 
abstract, however, in actuality the rule is inoperable. The attempt to decide 
property cases in correspondence to an owner’s motive, separating “good” 
or acceptable reasons for action from “bad” or unacceptable ones, is 
doomed to fail. It is doomed to fail because bad or spiteful motivations are 
inseparable from good or nonspiteful motivations. 
This argument, to be established in this Part, topples the normative 
case for prohibiting acts motivated by spite alone. It is distinct from two 
other claims or problems that merely stress the difficulty in applying the 
spite prohibition, but do not render it inoperable or illusory. First, by stating 
that spiteful motivations are inseparable from nonspiteful motivations, I am 
not simply rehashing the claim made by others that the presence of spite—a 
subjective element—in a given case is tough to ascertain.272 The analysis in 
this Part assumes throughout that the owner’s spite is incontestable. 
Second, my claim that spiteful motivations are inseparable from 
nonspiteful motivations is dramatically different, and more daring, than the 
 
266 E.g., Berman, supra note 264, at 53.  
267 Larry Alexander, Is Morality Like the Tax Code?, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1839, 1845–46 (1997) 
(book review). 
268 Farnsworth, supra note 38, at 224–25. 
269 See Mitchell Berman, The Evidentiary Theory of Blackmail, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 850 
(1998). 
270 See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Paul Shechtman, Blackmail: An Economic Analysis of the Law, 
141 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1864 (1993). 
271 Farnsworth, supra note 38, at 224–25. 
272 E.g., Epstein, supra note 39, at 97; Farnsworth, supra note 38, at 235.  
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acknowledged practical problem presented by the owner motivated both by 
spiteful and nonspiteful intentions.273 In the cases to be discussed here, the 
owner is undeniably solely seeking to harm his neighbor, but that harm 
itself also, inherently, delivers to the owner benefits beyond his satisfaction 
at the neighbor’s suffering. The nonspiteful motivation is not an additional, 
independent motivation. It is part of the spiteful motivation. 
Disputes involving business competitors should render this inelegant 
pronouncement intelligible and, more importantly, compelling. Hence this 
Part will initially develop the argument through those cases. It will then 
generalize the argument to all neighbors’ disputes. The distinction between 
spiteful and nonspiteful motives will emerge as a formalistic illusion, 
diverting legal analysis from its true normative concern: a social 
assessment of an act’s effects. This finding’s ramifications for property 
theory debates will be addressed in this Part’s closing section. 
A. Spite’s Nonspiteful Benefits: The Competition Cases 
As advocated by most writers, the prohibition on spite mandates, and 
is dependent upon, the singling out of owners acting on spite alone. This 
Part of the Article argues that this latter endeavor is forlorn and hence the 
normative case for the spite prohibition is hollow. The futility of the 
endeavor is most readily apparent in cases where the owner and his spited 
neighbor are competitors. Therefore, I will lay the foundation for this 
Article’s normative thesis through an examination of those cases. 
Many of the spite disputes from water law and land use law reviewed 
in Part II involved neighbors who were competitors. For example, the 
protagonists of disputes analyzed there counted owners of adjoining resorts 
desiring the same percolating waters;274 neighboring owners both seeking to 
pump water for sale;275 the hotel owner blocking sunrays from reaching 
another hotel’s pool;276 and the shopping center’s owner building a fence to 
curtail access to the adjacent shopping center.277 The most common spiteful 
conflicts between neighboring competitors, however, which will be 
reviewed for the first time now, are disputes over signs. The scenarios in all 
these disputes are almost identical. An owner erects on his land, where he 
 
273 Most courts will refuse to find an act spiteful when it is motivated by both spiteful and 
nonspiteful motivations. A few will still enjoin the act—if the spiteful motivation was dominant. E.g., 
Hunt v. Coggin, 20 A. 250, 250 (N.H. 1890). 
274 Miller v. Black Rock Springs Imp. Co., 40 S.E. 27 (Va. 1901). 
275 Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer, 99 N.W. 882 (Minn. 1904). 
276 Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So.2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1959). 
277 In re Cross County Square Assocs., 133 B.R. 569 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
SHOKED (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/2016 12:24 PM 
110:357 (2016) Two Hundred Years of Spite 
405 
operates a store, service station, restaurant, or motel, a large advertising 
sign whose purpose is to limit passersby’s view of his neighbor’s property, 
where the same business is conducted.278 Or the sign’s purpose is to cover 
that neighbor’s billboard,279 or to obstruct entrances to his premises.280 
Alternatively the owner may place a large showcase blocking pedestrians’ 
ability to notice goods displayed in the neighboring competitor’s 
windows.281 
Although the cases are indistinguishable in their material facts—in all, 
the owner acted solely to harm his neighbor’s business—they have met 
contradicting legal fates. Some courts enjoin the “spite signs.”282 Others do 
not.283 This attitudinal difference does not owe itself to disagreement over 
the apposite rule. Since the late nineteenth century, when such disputes 
arose alongside consumer society, practically all courts have applied to 
signs the rule developed in land use, as reviewed in Section II.B.284 Given 
that a sign is a structure, and one resembling a fence, the consensus view is 
that while normally a sign decreasing neighbors’ exposure to light and air 
is not actionable, it becomes actionable if motivated by spite alone.285 Thus 
both the sign conflicts’ relevant facts and the rule to which they are subject 
are common across cases. Yet courts part ways in their appraisal of the 
facts’ ability to meet the rule; courts diverge on whether a sign erected 
solely to harm a competitor counts as motivated by spite alone. 
While hardly elaborated upon, the underlying problem generating this 
disagreement is symptomatic of the inescapable weakness, which this Part 
aims to pinpoint, of the normative grounding routinely provided for the 
spite prohibition. Specifically, the cases are afflicted by the problem of the 
 
278 E.g., Hutcherson v. Alexander, 70 Cal. Rptr. 366, 369 (Ct. App. 1968); Parker v. Harvey, 
164 So. 507, 508 (La. Ct. App. 1935); 44 Plaza, Inc. v. Gray-Pac Land Co., 845 S.W.2d 576, 578 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1992). 
279 E.g., Campbell v. Hammock, 90 S.E.2d 415, 415 (Ga. 1955); Scharlack v. Gulf Oil Corp., 
368 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Rogers v. Scaling, 298 S.W.2d 877, 878 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1957). 
280 E.g., Parker, 164 So. at 508; Green & Green Co. v. Thresher 83 A. 711, 712 (Pa. 1912); 
Maxwell v. Lax, 292 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954). 
281 E.g., Gallagher v. Dodge, 48 Conn. 387, 389 (1880); Hallock v. Scheyer, 33 Hun 111, 111–12 
(N.Y. Gen. Term 1884). 
282 E.g., Hutcherson, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 373; McClosky v. Martin, 56 So. 2d 916, 918 (Fla. 1951); 
Sundowner, Inc. v. King, 509 P.2d 785, 787 (Idaho 1973); Parker, 164 So. at 512; Hallock, 33 Hun at 
112–13; Rogers, 298 S.W.2d at 880. 
283 E.g., In re Cross County Square Assocs., 133 B.R. 569, 574 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991); 44 Plaza, 
845 S.W.2d at 580; Scharlack, 368 S.W.2d at 707. 
284 E.g., Gallagher , 48 Conn. at 392–94; Sundowner, 509 P.2d at 787; Hunt v. Coggin, 20 A. 250, 
250 (N.H. 1890). 
285 J.W. Thomey, Annotation, Billboards and Other Outdoor Advertising Signs as Civil Nuisance, 
38 A.L.R.3d 647, § 2[a], at 650 (1971). 
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inseparability of competitive motivations from spiteful motivations, which 
renders the term spiteful useless.  
Owners in signage cases are unquestionably acting to harm their 
neighbors: the spite sign is planted with the sole purpose of impeding 
patrons from entering the neighbor’s business, thereby harming the 
neighbor’s well-being. Yet the patron impeded from entering the 
neighbor’s business will be more likely to patronize the erecting owner’s 
business. Any harm to the neighbor represents a benefit to the owner, given 
that the two are competitors thrust in a zero-sum game. The benefit 
experienced by the owner harming his neighbor through a spite sign is not, 
therefore, merely subjective satisfaction from his neighbor’s distress—a 
benefit, which, as explained above, many argue must be omitted from legal 
analysis.286 The benefit the owner obtains from the spite sign is indisputably 
pecuniary: the potential for increased business. Still, that benefit is 
generated solely from the harm to the neighbor—from the neighbor’s 
potential loss of business. Can the owner thus be characterized as acting 
upon spite alone? Upon, that is, a desire to harm without intent to procure a 
benefit? 
One early court, concluding that the answer must be no, identified 
spite’s logical incoherence in this context, but, beholden to limiting legal 
theories of the time, only accentuated the problem this Section seeks to 
highlight. In 1880 the Connecticut court explained: 
So far as [the owner’s showcase blocking the neighboring window display] 
was intended to annoy the [neighboring] store it was not so much from malice, 
as we ordinarily understand that term . . . as from a spirit of competition in 
business—of ill will perhaps—yet not so much against the object of it as an 
individual as against him as a rival in business.287 
The difficulty in applying the term malice to the owner’s behavior in this 
case, and all competition cases, was impossible to ignore. However, the 
solution the court provided—the hair splitting between “malice” and “ill 
will,” between the neighbor as “an individual” and as “a rival in 
business”—only compounded it. 
This fine distinction, professing to insulate malice from other akin 
intentions, was characteristic of the era’s formalist legal reasoning.288 
Similar technical differentiations, which the classical legal thinkers of the 
 
286 See supra notes 269–71 and accompanying text; see also Rattigan v. Wile, 841 N.E.2d 680, 687 
(Mass. 2006) (stating that the law does not recognize any utility the actor derives from annoying his 
neighbor); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 829 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (same). 
287 Gallagher, 48 Conn. at 394–95. 
288 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960, at 17–19 
(1992). 
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day readily drew, led Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1894 to author his 
groundbreaking article289 denigrating judicial reliance on motive in torts. 
Holmes’s polemic underlined the meaninglessness of the term spite in the 
context of competitive relations and hence it merits attention here.290 
Holmes claimed that purported questions about intent reduce to nothing 
more than questions of public policy.291 Holmes’s celebrated hypothetical 
was of the man who sets up a shop in a small village which can support but 
one of the kind, intending to ruin the shop of a deserving widow 
established there already.292 The man’s subjective intent is spiteful and 
supposedly reproachable, yet no court would enjoin him. The reason, 
Holmes argued, was the strong public policy endorsing competition.293 “[I]n 
all such cases the ground of decision is policy; and the advantages to the 
community, on the one side and the other, are the only matters really 
entitled to be weighed.”294 
Holmes admitted that perhaps there were instances where the 
competitor’s harmful act could not be said to foster competition.295 There, 
where the only potential public policy backing the act is the freedom to 
spite, motive-based restrictions may become sensible, but “[s]uch a case I 
find hard to imagine . . . [thus] there is no need to stay in such thin air.”296 
Surprisingly, however, precisely such a case—where the competitor’s spite 
could not be said to promote competition—did, at least arguably, 
materialize fifteen years later. But even there, the deplorable motive did not 
dictate the result—policy considerations did. Hence the case spotlights the 
pointlessness of motive explorations. 
In 1909 a Minnesota court held liable an affluent banker, entertaining 
no particular interest in hairstyling or the financial potentialities thereof, 
when he opened a barbershop solely to drive the town’s only barber, whom 
 
289 Holmes, supra note 178. 
290 For more on the debate over the definition of legitimate competition that Holmes was engaging, 
see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of Competition, 74 IOWA L. REV. 
1019 (1989). 
291 See Holmes, supra note 178, at 3. 
292 Id. 
293 Id. Courts have consistently held that “lawful competition must be encouraged, fostered, and 
protected.” Gieseke v. IDCA, Inc., 844 N.W.2d 210, 218 (Minn. 2014); see also, e.g., Standard Oil Co. 
v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951) (“The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the 
value of competition.”). 
294 Holmes, supra note 178, at 9. 
295 Id. at 5. Holmes’s iconoclastic theory generated an exchange with James Barr Ames, who 
believed that intent is relevant to torts. Ames specifically argued that cases exist where the defendant’s 
act could not be viewed as serving the interest of competition. J.B. Ames, How Far an Act May Be a 
Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor, 18 HARV. L. REV. 411, 420 (1905). 
296 Holmes, supra note 178, at 5–6. 
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he despised, out of business.297 Nonetheless, this deplorable motive was not 
the court’s governing concern. Grading motivations among competitors 
was an idle exercise, reckoned the court, which was clearly heavily 
influenced by rising realist thinking.298 “We do not intend to . . . become 
entangled in the subtleties connected with the words ‘malice’ and 
‘malicious.’”299 The failing of the banker’s act was, the court explained, not 
its motive.300 It was that inasmuch as the banker was ready to quit the 
market after ruining the barber, his opening of the barbershop defeated the 
public interest in competition.301 
Even in this, the most extreme of cases, Holmes’s insight regarding 
the unsuitability of motive tests for the competition torts proved 
irresistible.302 It should also inform the evaluation of property disputes such 
as those over spite signs. In cases involving competitors, the term malice or 
spite, understood as the intent to inflict harm to another without generating 
benefits to the perpetrator, is meaningless.303 Competition is always 
deliberate, and it is always malicious: “Most businessmen don’t like their 
competitors, or for that matter competition. They want to make as much 
money as possible and getting a monopoly is one way of making a lot of 
money.”304 The actor seeks to harm his neighbor and competitor towards 
whom he harbors deep hostility. Concurrently, that wanton harm inflicted 
on the neighbor will generate an unquestionably tangible benefit to the 
owner. Consequently, it is impossible to ever identify him as motivated by 
malice alone—i.e., as spiteful. If some competitive practices—say, certain 
signs—are to be prohibited, it thus cannot be due to their objectionable, 
spiteful motivations. The inquiry into the objectionable nature of the 
competitive practice—here, the sign—must become an inquiry into what 
counts as a reasonable competitive practice—in this instance, what counts 
as a reasonable sign (in terms of size, design, etc.) in the relevant 
 
297 Tuttle v. Buck, 119 N.W. 946, 946, 948 (Minn. 1909). 
298 The court made the quintessentially realist observation: “[G]eneralizations are of little value in 
determining concrete cases.” Id. at 947. 
299 Id.  
300 Id. at 948. 
301 Id. 
302 The relevant tort was interference with contractual relations. 
303 The Restatement notes that “cases recite, mostly in dicta, that one who engages in competition 
solely or primarily for the purpose of causing harm to another is subject to liability.” RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1995). In antitrust law, intent is 
irrelevant. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(“[W]hat has become an antitrust commonplace, that if conduct is not objectively anticompetitive the 
fact that it was motivated by hostility to competitors . . . is irrelevant.”). 
304 Olympia Equip., 797 F.2d at 379. 
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geographical area.305 Analyses of “subtleties” associated with the term 
spite, such as distinctions between “malice” and “ill will,” merely conceal 
the actual policy analysis. They camouflage the task the courts are really 
assuming: setting contours for acceptable competitive relations.306 
Spite analysis breaks down in cases where neighbors are competitors 
since any harm to one is by definition a benefit to another. Intent to solely 
inflict harm is also intent to derive a competitive advantage and thus it is a 
nonexistent category. The spite sign cases are good examples of this 
phenomenon since the contending parties are formally competitors. But 
many other disputes reviewed in Part II, where the neighbors were not 
identified as business competitors, also implicate—if not overt, then at least 
latent—competitive relations.307 They hence suffer from the same analytical 
flaw. The owner pumping water away from his neighbor may be harming 
his neighbor to improve his own standing in the market for water.308 The 
owner blocking her neighbor’s lake views with a spite fence may be 
increasing her own property’s value by reducing the supply of desirable 
lake houses.309 In all these cases, the insight stands: any settlement of the 
dispute cannot be guided by an appraisal of the spitefulness of the actor’s 
motive since that motive is always concurrently spiteful and nonspiteful. 
 
305 See, e.g., Hullinger v. Prahl, 233 N.W.2d 584, 585–86 (S.D. 1975). 
306 Competition may have costs and is therefore subject to regulation. For example, the concept of 
“wasteful competition” refers to cases where competition leads to duplicate services, reduced safety 
standards, etc. The argument that the particular characteristics of an industry might make competition 
undesirable will not lead a court to reject an antitrust claim. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United 
States, 435 U.S. 679, 687–96 (1978). The reason, however, is not that these claims are always factually 
untrue or normatively unacceptable, but rather that such a determination was for Congress to make, not 
the courts. Id. at 692. And indeed, as administrative law drastically expanded during the New Deal and 
thereafter, Congress enabled anticompetitive arrangement designed to combat wasteful competition. An 
example is the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (1938). This act directed 
the Civil Aeronautics Authority to approve agreements between carriers “relating to the establishment 
of transportation rates, fares, charges or classifications . . . or for controlling, regulating, preventing, or 
otherwise eliminating destructive, oppressive, or wasteful competition” if “it does not find [the 
agreement] to be adverse to the public interest.” Id. § 412, 52 Stat. 1004. Another example of the 
relevance of wasteful competition concept to legal regulation is found in patents. See Mark F. Grady & 
Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305, 316–18 (1992). 
307 Another way of thinking of some of these cases, which also questions the soundness of 
deploring spite, is as cases where one owner had produced a positive externality from which a neighbor 
has benefitted without paying (since property law does not mandate payment for such externalities, such 
as the ability to enjoy the trees planted on a neighbor’s land or the light coming through it) and is now, 
by blocking the neighbor’s access to such benefits, trying to assure payment. For the argument that 
moves to contain or reduce beneficial externalities by their producer, though seemingly spiteful and 
inefficient, may “serve as precursors to contracts with other benefited parties that will realign the 
production of benefits with the receipt of proceeds,” see Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 
116 YALE L.J. 1400, 1452 (2007). 
308 See, e.g., Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer, 93 N.W. 907, 907–08 (Minn. 1903). 
309 See, e.g., Holbrook v. Morrison, 100 N.E. 1111, 1111–12 (Mass. 1913) (involving two 
competing real estate developers). 
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Courts resolve these conflicts through an appraisal of the social desirability 
of the specific competitive practice. They reach policy determinations, not 
intent findings. 
B. Neighbors as Competitors: Ownership, Status, and Spite’s Ubiquity 
As the previous Section established, spite is a meaningless legal 
category in cases involving business competitors. But can it still perhaps 
carry normative weight in regulating the relationship between those owners 
who are not business competitors—for example, the Introduction’s Mr. 
Markovitz and Ms. Tuohy? This Section will argue that it cannot 
realistically be expected to perform even this more modest task—not as 
long as property law takes for granted all owners’ ability to engage in some 
form of competitive relations. As shall be seen, owners who, unlike the 
owners in the preceding Section, are not partaking in competition over 
clients may still be, or choose to be, interlocked in competition over status. 
Like business competition, status competition is premised upon the benefits 
derived from harming others, and, also like business competition, current 
law legitimizes it. Ultimately, this Section will argue, all owners are 
competitors—or, more accurately, all owners are free to view themselves 
as competing with other owners—and thus no owner can be reprimanded 
for being spiteful. 
To understand why, we must revisit property theory’s first principles, 
and specifically, the general rationales backing the owner’s freedom to act 
on his property—for example, to build an elaborate structure thereon.310 
Such freedom of action promotes overall welfare by incentivizing efficient 
development311: individuals may enjoy living in elaborate structures and 
thus their construction enhances efficiency. Such freedom of action also 
serves individual rights through an expanded realm for autonomy and self-
expression312: individuals may develop their identities through their choice 
of elaborate structures. But beyond these utilitarian and right-based goals, 
the freedom to use property serves another aim.313 
One of property law’s key functions, as Nestor Davidson recently 
reminded us, is to enable people to communicate their standing in 
 
310 See generally Nadav Shoked, The Duty to Maintain, 64 DUKE L.J. 437, 446–52 (2014) 
(reviewing the diverse normative reasons for property law’s privileging of the owner’s freedom).  
311 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348–49 
(1967). 
312 See Gregory S. Alexander, Property’s Ends: The Publicness of Private Law Values, 99 IOWA L. 
REV. 1257, 1264–69 (2014). 
313 On the distinction between utilitarian and right-based arguments for property, see JEREMY 
WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 79–87 (1988). 
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society.314 The idea that property confers on its holder a status and social 
power is intuitive and hardly controversial.315 In a landmark article, Morris 
Cohen memorably characterized property as state-delegated power: “[T]he 
law thus confers on me [the owner] a power, limited but real, to make [my 
neighbor] do what I want.”316 The freedom to own and use property permits 
the owner to convey a message to his neighbor and others respecting his 
omnipotence and standing vis-à-vis those others.317 In other words, an 
owner can build an elaborate structure to keep up with the Joneses, or to 
one-up the Joneses.318 
While this signaling function of property may not be a good in and of 
itself, it is presumed to advance property’s utilitarian and right-based 
functions.319 Overall welfare is normally served when people are motivated 
to work to improve their relative standing.320 Furthermore, status pursuit 
can be an important component of individual autonomy and self-
expression.321 Of course, the social desirability of reliance on power 
relations and hierarchical structures has always been subject to fierce 
debate.322 That debate, touching upon broad themes pertaining to the value 
of consumerism—and of capitalism itself323—falls far beyond our 
discussion’s reach. The debate’s basic premise, shared by all factions, 
suffices: the current social and legal system prioritizes individuals’ ability 
to pursue status and power through ownership of material goods. A cause 
for concern or celebration, this is a fact of modern law. Adam Smith thus 
 
314 Davidson, supra note 28, at 760. 
315 Id. at 775–78 (reviewing property’s history as an institution for the “constant process of 
competition and status anxiety” and listing works of thinkers commenting on this fact). 
316 Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927). 
317 See Edward K. Sadalla et al., Identity Symbolism in Housing, 19 ENV’T & BEHAV. 569, 572–73, 
583–86 (1987). 
318 See CONSTANCE PERIN, EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE 81–128 (1977) (arguing that home 
ownership in a “nice” neighborhood is often perceived as the top rung in the long climb up the social 
ladder). 
319 See Davidson, supra note 28, at 791; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Absolute Preferences and Relative 
Preferences in Property Law, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2157, 2163–64 (2012). 
320 Gertrud M. Fremling & Richard A. Posner, Status Signaling and the Law, with Particular 
Application to Sexual Harassment, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1069, 1074 (1999). 
321 See Leon Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison Processes, 7 HUM. REL. 117, 118–19 
(1954). 
322 See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST 
FOR STATUS 136–37 (1985); Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 809, 819 (2010); Luis Rayo & Gary S. Becker, Peer Comparisons and Consumer 
Debt, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 231, 231 (2006). 
323 See TIM KASSER, THE HIGH PRICE OF MATERIALISM 87–95 (2002); KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH 
ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY 85–86 (Jeffrey C. Isaac ed., Yale Univ. Press 2012) 
(1848); THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 16–17, 21–27 (Martha Banta ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (1899). 
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wrote of the “poor man’s son” who in a capitalist system is free to work 
more and amass more goods than he truly needs or desires, just to become 
visible to others.324 Comparably, in such a system, a Mr. Markovitz is free 
to build a large lake house he has no intention to inhabit or to sell for profit, 
just to bolster his stature through pressing his ex-wife, a Ms. Tuohy, to 
regret jilting him in favor of another who cannot afford such an abode. He 
may proceed even in the hypothetical case where in his mind his sole intent 
is to pain her through envy, with no regard to his own stature.325 Ownership 
encompasses—or maybe is—the power to make others jealous. 
Property law empowers an owner to build a fancy mansion to 
announce his arrival in the neighborhood and entice envy among 
neighbors.326 It enables owners to maintain a golf course in their 
community though they do not intend to use it, but want to exude prestige 
and social exclusivity.327 Governments sell “vanity plates,” signs meant to 
adorn personal properties (cars) catering to one want: the owner’s, well, 
vanity.328 All these activities are geared towards assuaging the owner’s ego 
or prestige—often at the expense of others’ ego or prestige. An owner 
undertaking any such activity may be driven by pure desire to harm others 
by downplaying their importance, success, or affluence. But through such 
downplaying, the owner boosts his own importance. Status and power are 
relative.329 An individual enjoys status by towering over others; power is 
wielded over others. Accordingly, an individual’s status and power are 
augmented when others’ status and power are denigrated. 
In a property system tolerating—indeed embracing—status 
competition, the category of spiteful motivations collapses. Intent to harm 
another—to lower another’s status—is also intent to benefit the owner—to 
increase the owner’s status. In his own eyes, and in those of other public 
members, the owner’s stature might improve thanks to the knock sustained 
 
324 ADAM SMITH, THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, pt. IV, ch. I, para. 8, at 211–14 (Knud 
Haakonssen ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (1759). 
325 An argument has been made that while some tend to assess their wealth and happiness in 
relative terms, others tend to do so in absolute terms. For the latter, a decrease in the wealth or 
happiness of others will not, arguably, augment their own wealth or happiness. Strahilevitz, supra note 
319, at 2159. The facts of the actual incidence, as described in note 4, supra, indicate that Mr. 
Markovitz was probably no stranger to relative preferences. 
326 See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, In Los Angeles, Vintage Houses Are Giving Way to Bulldozers, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2015, at A15. 
327 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 VA. L. REV. 
437, 468–76 (2006). 
328 See Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Vandergriff, 759 F.3d 388, 390–91 (5th 
Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239 
(2015). 
329 J. Sabini & M. Silver, Envy, in THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EMOTIONS 167, 172 (Rom Harré 
ed., 1986). 
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by that other. Thus an owner obtains a benefit from such an act in addition 
to any subjective enjoyment he derives from witnessing the other’s distress. 
As in business competition over clients, in status competition over 
standing, an act solely aimed at harming one’s adversary inherently 
benefits the actor. The owner may derive personal satisfaction from his 
neighbor’s suffering, but the act’s utility for him extends beyond that to 
include the permissible benefits of status signaling. An owner’s act can 
thence never be said to be motivated by a desire to harm—by spite—alone, 
as the supposed prohibition on spiteful acts requires. Therefore, the 
regulation of spiteful acts cannot be a regulation of spite. It must be a 
regulation of acts.330 
Concretely, the legitimacy of an act meant to magnify the owner’s 
relative status must revolve around the reasonableness of the means he 
chooses and the harm he inflicts—not around his subjective intent. The 
Casey case—which, as presented in Section II.C, cannot, by any stretch, be 
described as a case of business competition—nicely exemplifies this 
inevitable, and desirable, result general to all owners’ relationships. In 
Casey, a court struck down as a spiteful restraint on alienation a testator’s 
order that his son lose land devised to him if he transferred possession to 
his daughter (the testator’s granddaughter).331 Had this result actually owed 
to the restraint’s motivation, it would have been baffling given other 
elements of the law. In American law, testators are under no obligation to 
leave property to their offspring; through property, owners can air their 
rancor and domineer family members even posthumously.332 Accordingly, 
the Casey testator was free to completely disinherit his son if he were upset 
over his relations with the granddaughter. While the devise to the son 
accompanied by the restraint on alienation was struck down,333 such 
disinheritance of the son would have been upheld. 
Why should the disinheritance be deemed less reprehensible than the 
restraint? Like the restraint on alienation, the disinheritance would have 
been inspired by the testator’s attitude towards his son and granddaughter. 
 
330 In an important article, Richard McAdams explained that the satisfaction of relative 
preferences—preference for status or prestige—might sometimes, but not always, lead to efficiency 
losses. Hence, though no judgment is passed on the merits of relative preferences, the effects and 
potential results of the race for status they induce in specific cases must be regulated. Richard H. 
McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 48–70 (1992). 
331 700 S.W.2d 46, 47, 49 (Ark. 1985). 
332 JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, & ESTATES 556 (9th ed. 2013). The sole exception 
is Louisiana, which, as a civil law state, provides a forced share of an inheritance to certain children. 
Id.; see also LA. CONST. art. XII, § 5 (“The legislature shall provide for the classification of 
descendants . . . as forced heirs.”).  
333 Casey, 700 S.W.2d at 49. 
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The acts did not differ in their motivation. They did differ, however, in the 
means employed to serve that motivation and in their effects—and it is that 
difference that dictates the diverging results.334 The restraint on alienation 
troubled the court since it pressured the son to cut ties with his daughter, 
and as the court explained, 
For public policy reasons, some cases have held that provisions by which the 
acquisition or retention of property interests was made to depend on the 
separation of parent and minor child were illegal conditions. “A broader 
objection has appeared on occasion against any provision which tends to 
disrupt or interfere with family relations.”335 
Had the testator simply disinherited his son, this consideration would have 
vanished. True, the son would have been punished for his relationship with 
the granddaughter. But he would not have been spurred to terminate it, and 
thus the public policy against interferences with familial relations would 
not have provided reason to eliminate the spiteful act. The objection to the 
spiteful restraint on alienation was not an objection to the testator’s spiteful 
intent, but rather to the specific means through which he expressed it. An 
owner cannot be sanctioned for lording it over others because that is an 
inherent power accompanying ownership. An owner can be sanctioned, 
however, when the particular way in which he flaunts his power generates 
harms that are judged, on objective policy grounds, unacceptable. 
Property enables competition. It allows owners to view other owners 
as competitors and to have society appraise their own standing and worth in 
relation to the standing and worth of those others. As long as private 
property is recognized as a weapon—perhaps the paramount weapon—in 
the social competition over status and power, spite, or at least the 
possibility thereof, is built into property. Courts cannot accuse owners, in 
such an environment, of engaging in activities whose sole purpose is to 
degrade others or lower their standing. By definition, those activities may 
also elevate the owner and increase his own standing. Courts will intervene 
when the specific activity, or the harm it wreaks, is objectively deplorable. 
Since the power to spite is inherent to ownership—since as an owner Mr. 
Markovitz is free to build a mansion to display his superiority to his 
neighbors or to simply make them jealous—spite is irrelevant as a test to 
 
334 It is possible to argue that in the second scenario the son suffered no harm—he was simply 
denied a benefit. The distinction may hold analytical and philosophical strength, see 1 JOEL FEINBERG, 
HARM TO OTHERS 31–36 (1984), but it is lacking in practical terms. In both cases the son ends without 
land he would have held had the testator not resented his relationship with the granddaughter. 
Regardless, even under the alternative account, the reason only one of the acts is censured is not the 
distinct motivation, but rather the presence of harm. 
335 Casey, 700 S.W.2d at 49 (quoting 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 27.19, at 671 (A. James 
Casner ed., 1952)). 
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settle property disputes; it cannot determine Mr. Markovitz’s right to erect 
a fence or a statue. The experience of American law, reviewed in Part II, 
bears out this normative conclusion. 
C. The Spitefulness of Ownership and Property Theory 
The disconnect between American law’s spite prohibition and actual 
spite, revealed in Part II, and actual spite’s normative impotence, 
established in this Part, discredit the prevailing assertion, reviewed in Part 
I, that spite law performs the supposedly momentous task of regulating 
owners’ intentions. Spite law does not, and cannot, represent an idea of 
abuse of right; it does not, and should not, ply motives to draw the 
perimeters of ownership’s reach. Does this imply that it is unimportant, that 
spite does not merit theoretical attention? Once spite sheds its illusory garb 
of an exception to property law’s objective underpinnings, it comes across 
as less conspicuous. Still, paradoxically, when accurately conceived as 
substantiating—rather than subverting—those underpinnings, spite 
becomes more significant for the study of American property law. 
Specifically, it lends credence to one of the two central property theories 
embroiled in a debate over the essence of property. These concluding 
paragraphs will explain why, and thereby will employ this Article’s 
insights respecting the inherent spitefulness of ownership to refine our 
understanding of property as an institution. 
For the past two decades, a reinvigorated American property literature 
has been cleaved between two competing property conceptions. One 
loosely grouped camp of writers, which can be titled “exclusion 
theorists,”336 affirms that the heart of property is the owner’s power. 
Conversely, a second loosely grouped camp, “relational theorists,” 
conceives social relations as constituting property’s nucleus. 
Exclusion theorists’ main contention is that property has a unitary 
essence. For many of these theorists, that essence is the owner’s right to 
exclude others—property’s sine qua non.337 Others emphasize the owner’s 
right to use his property, for which a right to exclude is prerequisite.338 
 
336 See also HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 37–40 (2011) (characterizing 
such theories as “exclusion-centric”). 
337 E.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 731 (1998). 
338 E.g., J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 71 (defining “the right to property” as “a 
right to exclude others from things which is grounded by the interest we have in the use of things”); 
Adam Mossoff, What Is Property?: Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 439 
(2003) (defining property as comprising “the exclusive rights to acquire, use and dispose of one’s 
possessions”); Eric R. Claeys, Property 101: Is Property a Thing or a Bundle, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
617, 618 (2009) (book review) (“Others of us sympathetic to property’s exclusive tendencies prefer to 
conceive of property as a right exclusively to determine a thing’s use.”). 
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According to exclusion theorists, property has good reasons to stress the 
right to exclude. The right facilitates an owner’s ability to make choices 
respecting his land, which satisfies a “robust interest in autonomy.”339 It 
also serves as an effective notice system facilitating a market’s existence340: 
since the right to exclude protects all the varied actions the owner can pick, 
it spares society the costly need to specify them.341 
Relational theorists remain unpersuaded. They refuse to accord 
primacy to the owner’s dominium over an external thing and his attendant 
right to exclude others from it.342 The theories addressed here collectively 
as relational are diverse—they include progressive property,343 social 
obligation,344 human flourishing,345 civic republicanism,346 objective 
wellbeing,347 and more.348 In one way or another, however, they all build on 
the basic realist notion that property rights are not unitary, absolute rights 
over things, but rather bundles of legal relationships between people.349 
Current relational theorists supplement this metaphor with a normative 
argument. Property rights are about relationships, and their goal is to 
promote certain relationships—those deemed socially desirable.350 Hence, 
property law often limits owners’ freedom in order to empower others to 
 
339 PENNER, supra note 338, at 49; Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Gridlock, 53 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 9, 24 (2011) (book review). 
340 See Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1704 (2012). 
341 See id. at 1702–03. 
342 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 
134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 742–44 (1986). 
343 Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 
743–44 (2009). 
344 Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. 
REV. 745, 748 (2009). 
345 Colin Crawford, The Social Function of Property and the Human Capacity to Flourish, 
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1089, 1089 (2011). 
346 William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1336 (1991). 
347 Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of Property Law, 
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1672–73 (2003). 
348 E.g., Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A Pluralist 
Interpretation, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 653, 654–58 (2006).  
349 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28–59 (1913). 
350 E.g., Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property As Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1938 (2005) (arguing 
for “an understanding of ownership, not primarily as a means of separating individuals off from each 
other, but of tying them together into social groups”). 
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sustain meaningful relationships.351 Examples include public 
accommodations law352 and nuisance law.353 
Exclusion theorists relegate these and similar elements of the law to 
the periphery.354 For them property’s core is, as it must be, the trespass tort, 
anointing the owner the land’s sole gatekeeper.355 Thus, as befits a 
theoretical dispute about the essential quality of property, the debate 
between relational and exclusionary theories boils down to a controversy 
over the proper location in the law of limits affixed to an owner’s freedom 
so as to promote desirable social relationships: Are such doctrines a 
peripheral afterthought or property law’s core?356 
It is precisely in answering this key question that the legal standing of 
spite can interfere in the debate. At first glance, the traditional reading of 
spite’s role in the law, presented in Part I, jells well with relational theories. 
A limit placed on ownership and driven by the owner’s intentions serves 
the relational account of property even better than other deviations from the 
owner’s freedom, such as public accommodations or nuisance, since it is 
explicitly grounded in the sentiments the owner feels towards his 
neighbors—that is, in the relationship between an owner and others. For 
similar reasons, the abuse of rights principle, which loudly declares that the 
owner’s right is not absolute, and that its core is not freedom but acceptable 
attitudes towards others, forcefully resonates with relational sensibilities. 
 
351 SINGER, supra note 159, at 12. 
352 E.g., Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private 
Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996) (showing how the history of public accommodations law 
suggests that there are substantial limitations to the classical conception of property as ownership). 
353 E.g., ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE 20 (2003) (arguing that owners are always 
confronted with nuisance law as a constraint on their ability to freely use their lands). 
354 E.g., Epstein, supra note 39, at 74–79 (arguing that nuisance law merely introduces 
nonexclusionary considerations for extreme cases); Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original 
Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459, 502 (2009) (arguing that public accommodations laws are 
located on the law’s edges). 
355 See Merrill, supra note 337, at 734–35. 
356 Compare Henry E. Smith, Response, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and 
Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 971–88 (2009), with Gregory S. 
Alexander, Reply, The Complex Core of Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1063, 1063–68 (2009). See 
also Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853, 1858 (2012) (arguing that 
“the right to exclude can no longer be considered the core of private ownership” in light of the 
prevalence of governance property); Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 
112 COLUM. L. REV. 1409, 1419 (2012) (“This strategy [i.e., exclusionists’ confinement of 
nonexclusionary rules to the periphery] is doomed to fail because the doctrines that do not comply with 
the exclusion principle are in fact not marginal or peripheral to the life of property but deal instead with 
some of our most commonplace human interactions regarding resources.”); Thomas W. Merrill & 
Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1849, 1891 (2007) (arguing that 
“[t]he law of nuisance, landlord–tenant, future interests, servitudes, trusts, private contracting, and 
regulation” are “refinements outside of the core of property”). 
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This reflexive appeal of the abuse of right principle to relational-
minded commentators might partially account for the intensifying efforts to 
equate spite with an abuse of right principle, as reported in Part I, and to 
admonish spite, as outlined in the opening paragraphs of this Part. 
Therefore, the failure of both endeavors, as established in this Article, 
might strike some as serving to bolster exclusion theories. But in fact, 
paradoxically, the exposure of deplorable mental states as a meaningless 
legal category in property law, serves, I believe, as strong reinforcement for 
relational theories. 
Tying an act’s legitimacy to the owner’s attitude towards his neighbor 
might come across as the ultimate tool for enforcing a relational approach. 
Yet this allure of the spite prohibition for relational theorists is superficial. 
A mental-state criterion dictating allowable acts actually avoids the general 
practices and aims that relational theories champion. These are 
consequentialist theories.357 They are concerned with social values—with 
designing property rules that occasion a healthy social system.358 In 
contrast, as a motives test, the spite prohibition is backward-looking and 
consequence-indifferent. 
By definition, a mental-state-based prohibition curtails the role of the 
social, objective assessment of property uses’ effects. Often the spite test is 
explicitly offered by antirelational, exclusion commentators as a way to 
evade policy analysis and the promotion of social well-being through legal 
regulation. Richard Epstein endorses it because 
[t]he motive test (whatever its weakness) has an apparent dual advantage [in 
spite fence cases]: it avoids the open-ended and explicit comparisons of costs 
and benefits that are everywhere the bane of the legal system; and it removes 
the need to make specific collective determinations about height, shape, color, 
and the like, which are again difficult to generate through common law 
decisions.359 
Other nonrelational scholars, too, argue for the replacement of flexible 
policy analysis with clear rules tethering legal results to owners’ mental 
states.360 The form of analysis these commentators strive to displace is 
 
357 Gregory S. Alexander, The Public Use Requirement and the Character of Consequentialist 
Reasoning, in CONTEXT, CRITERIA & CONSEQUENCES OF EXPROPRIATION (B. Hoops et al. eds., 
forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2517595 [http://perma.cc/
L8ZB-BC3K] (explaining that human flourishing is a consequentialist theory); Oren Bracha & Talha 
Syed, Beyond Efficiency: Consequence-Sensitive Theories of Copyright, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 229, 
245 (2014) (arguing that such “democratic” and “distributive” theories are consequence-sensitive). 
358 See supra notes 343–51 and accompanying text. 
359 Epstein, supra note 39, at 97. 
360 E.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 319, at 2186–87.  
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precisely that coveted by relational theories.361 Relational writers normally 
believe that property law must always discharge public policy judgments 
grounded in social cost–benefit analysis because property is unfailingly 
social.362 Land, they explain, is a limited resource registering all activities 
owners make and thereby setting the contours for others’ interactions.363 
Emphasizing the reasoning leading an individual owner to pick an 
activity, rather than the activity’s effects on land and on others, ignores 
property’s special nature. In a different context, Hannah Arendt once noted 
“[t]he reality and reliability of the human world rest primarily on the fact 
that we are surrounded by things more permanent than the activity by 
which they were produced, and potentially even more permanent than the 
lives of their authors.”364 A focus on the author–actor, which may be 
normatively requisite in other legal fields,365 ignores this special nature of 
property law’s subject matter.366 This focus’s deficiencies are sometimes 
practical and easy to discern. Since the actor may not last as long as his 
activity’s effects, the intent behind the activity may recede into the 
shadows, while its effects endure. For example, the owner who built a 
fence spitefully motivated may be gone, replaced by an owner rather fond 
of his neighbor, yet the fence remains. Can it still be removed as a spite 
fence? Does spite “run with the land”?367 As legal realism’s progeny, 
relational theories would discard this metaphysical question, preferring 
instead a concrete evaluation of the fence’s everlasting objective harms and 
benefits.368 
 
361 See Nadav Shoked, Response, Property’s Perspective (or of Whom To Be Jealous), 161 U. PA. 
L. REV. ONLINE 118, 130 (2013). 
362 E.g., Joseph William Singer, Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 1287, 1299 
(2014) (“Property institutions not only regulate the complexity of human interaction, but also shape the 
character of those interactions. Property is not only about the allocation of scarce resources, the 
management of complex information, or the coordination of land use among competing users; it is 
about our way of life. . . . Property is about the social order . . . .”). 
363 E.g., Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 829–32 (2009). 
364 HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 95–96 (2d ed. 1998). 
365 For an argument that motives should be considered in criminal law, see Janice Nadler & Mary-
Hunter McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive, and the Psychology of Blame, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 255 
(2012). 
366 See LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 126–27 
(2003) (explaining that claims for property rights are unique among rights claims, such as freedom of 
speech, because they tend to involve the use or control of physical, external, finite things, and hence 
they do not enjoy the same presumptive power across a broad swath of cases as other rights claims do). 
367 Running with the land means that the right or obligation passes automatically to successive 
owners. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.1(1)(a), at 8 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
368 The most famous realist assault on such questions is Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense 
and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935). 
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The fact that spite doctrine concerned itself with this form of analysis 
throughout American legal history, as seen in Part II, thus reinforces 
relational theories. It proves that property law is about ownership’s social 
nature, and not about the individual owner—neither his mental states, nor 
his freedom of action cherished by exclusion theories. American spite 
serves as factual testimony to the relational claim that legal decisions 
respecting property rights involve a calculation of costs and benefits. 
Exclusion theorists may plausibly persist in the stance that the interest 
balancing introduced through spite in the nineteenth century merely 
represented peripheral “refinements” to the general owner freedom rules 
respecting water law and land use at the time.369 Still, the fact that in 
different subfields—water law, land use, support rights, restraints on 
alienation—whenever the law heroically attempted to concentrate 
decisionmaking powers in the owner, it always eventually had to retreat 
and introduce refinements—through spite doctrine or otherwise—
incarnates the irresistible draw of interest balancing. In this story of spite, 
we find vindication for relational theorists’ normative claim that the 
owner’s freedom must be limited. 
In addition, our exploration of spite supplies this normative stance 
with yet another, new rationale. Property, as seen in this final Part of this 
Article, always contains the seed of spitefulness. Harms to others, as well 
as a desire to harm others, may accompany all and any acts of the owner. 
This observation does not, of course, provide reason to ban all owners’ 
acts. It does, however, press the need for close monitoring of the social 
costs and benefits of those acts. The American law of spite embodies the 
realization that spite towards others is an inherent component of property in 
a capitalist society. But while it would be counterproductive therefore to 
ban malicious motives, it would also be dangerous to let owners do as they 
please with the limited, shared resource that is land. Owners’ conduct must 
be regulated—but in accordance with the marks that that conduct leaves on 
the outside world, not in accordance with the owners’ motivations.  
The exploration of American spite law’s history and logic confirms 
that property law rejected both an emphasis on the owner’s freedom and on 
his subjective mindset. It always tamed rules privileging the owner’s 
freedom through the introduction of social considerations—as relational 
property theories command. 
 
369 “Refinement” is the role to which these theorists confine balancing. Merrill & Smith, supra note 
356, at 1891. 
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CONCLUSION 
Is there something wrong with the middle-finger statue Mr. Markovitz 
erected? And had he alternatively opted to erect a fence, should there have 
been something wrong with that fence? The answers may be debatable, but 
this Article shows that there could be no debate that they must have nothing 
to do with Mr. Markovitz’s wretched motive—whether it gave rise to a 
statue or to a fence. The law on the books often suggests otherwise, and so 
do legal commentators, but American property law in action never targeted 
spiteful acts on account of their motives.370 Spite did play a constitutive part 
in the emergence of modern property law in the nineteenth century—across 
different key subfields such as water and land use—but not as a subjective 
test. Rather, spite was a beachhead for objective balancing tests assessing 
the reasonableness of means employed by owners to exercise their rights. 
Such balancing is normatively indispensable, whereas a subjective test is 
normatively wanting. There might be good reasons to hold that an owner 
such as Ms. Tuohy should not be exposed to aesthetic harms,371 or that she 
should be able to continuously enjoy exposure to light and air.372 But these 
reasons are grounded not in a judgment respecting acceptable and 
unacceptable individual motives for action, but rather in a judgment 
respecting acceptable and unacceptable social harms. The tastelessness of 
Mr. Markovitz’s motive is legally, and normatively, irrelevant. The 




370 See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15 (1910) 
(“[D]istinctions between law in the books and law in action . . . will appear, and it will be found that 
today also the distinction between legal theory and judicial administration is often a very real and a very 
deep one.”). 
371 For arguments supporting the recognition of aesthetic nuisances, see Raymond Robert Coletta, 
The Case for Aesthetic Nuisance: Rethinking Traditional Judicial Attitudes, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 141 
(1987).  
372 See, e.g., Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182, 184–85 (Wis. 1982). 
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